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Some Observations and Proposals on 
the Nature of the Fourth 
Amendment 
RONALD J. BACIGAL* 
The well-recognized lack of consistency and clarity in fourth amend-
ment1 decisions2 results from a judicial failure to articulate the un-
derlying principles of the fourth amendment.3 Without clearly 
articulated principles, courts are unable to discern legally material 
distinctions among the varying factual situations.4 One unaddressed 
question is whether the fourth amendment should be viewed from an 
• B.S., 1964, Concord College; J.D., 1967, Washington & Lee University. Professor 
of Law, University of Richmond. Member, District of Columbia Bar. 
1. The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. E.g, Stone, The Scope of the Fourth Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of 
Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1916 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 1193, 1197 
(1976): ''The Supreme Court has consistentl7 failed to articulate a fully satisfactory 
framework for Fourth Amendment analysis.' See Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth 
Amendmen~ 42 U. Cm. L. REV. 47, 50 (1974). See also Dworkin, Fact Style Adjudica-
tion and the Fourth Amendment: The Limits of Lawyering, 48 IND. L. J. 329, 329 (1973); 
LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The Course of True Law ••. Has Not ••. Run Smooth," 
1966 U. !LL. L.F. 255 (title quoting Frankfurter, J., concurring in Chapman v. United 
States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961)). 
3. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 49. 
4. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 254 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(every factual situation contains considerations that are "not easily quantified and, 
therefore, not easily weighed one against the other"). See also Dworkin, supra note 2; 
LaFave, "Case-by-Case Adjudication" versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robin-
son Dilemma, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 127. 
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individual perspective, which emphasizes protection of the interests 
of individual citizens, or from a limitation perspective, which empha-
sizes the regulation of governmental conduct.5 The individual per-
spective focuses only on the target6 of the search and governmental 
action taken with respect to that subject. The motives of the govern-
ment officials are irrelevant.7 Motives are important, however, to the 
limitation perspective.8 
The individual perspective and the limitation perspective are com-
plementary rather than mutually exclusive, but selection of one over 
the other often can produce different legal results. The timed or pre-
text arrest problem illustrates the divergence of these two models.9 
For example, the police suspect that a student is hiding marijuana in 
his locker. Rather than obtain a search warrant, the police arrest the 
student when he is using his locker so they can search the locker 
incident to the arrest.10 From the individual perspective, the inva-
sion of the student's property and privacy interests remains the same 
regardless of the motivation for the search. From the limitation per-
spective, however, acceptability of the search depends on the legiti-
macy of the government official's purpose and motive. When the 
government's purpose is to arrest the student wherever he is found, 
chance determines whether the police will search the locker. If the 
purpose behind the timing and location of the arrest is to search the 
locker, the government has consciously exercised its power to search. 
The limitation perspective permits more stringent limitations on 
planned warrantless searches than on governmental activity inadver-
tently resulting in a search.11 
The Supreme Court has not expressly acknowledged the existence 
of a choice of perspectives, 12 but has apparently adopted the individ-
5. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment; 58 MrnN. L. REV. 349, 367 
(1974); Weinreb, supranote 2, at 68. These two views are not limited to fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence. The atomistic and regulatory perspectives can also be applied to 
the fifth and sixth amendments, and to the fourteenth amendment's due process 
clause. See generally Amsterdam, supra; Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: 
Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MrnN. L. REV. 47 (1964); Grano, 
Kirby, Biggers, & Ash, Do Any Constitutional Safeguards Remain Against the Danger 
of Convicting the Innocent?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 719 (1974). 
6. In this article, the terms "target" and "target individual" refer to the individual 
whose person, house, papers or effects are searched or seized by the government. 
7. Of course, the motivation or intent of the police could be relevant to the individ-
ual perspective, if the individual's right were defined as a right to be free of planned 
warrantless searches. Such a definition of the individual's right encompasses the lim-
itation perspective. 
8. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971). 
9. This problem arises when a police officer having valid grounds for arrest times it 
so that search-incident-to-arrest powers can be invoked, thereby avoiding the warrant 
requirement. See, e.g, Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 
1968); United States v. Harris, 321 F.2d 739, 743 (6th Cir. 1963) (Boyd, J., dissenting); 
Taglavore v. United States, 291F.2d262, 266-67 (9th Cir.1961); Adairv. State, 427 S.W.2d 
67, 72 (Tex. Crim. 1968) (Onion, J., dissenting). 
10. To be searched mcident to arrest, the locker would have to be an "area 'within 
(the arrestee's] immediate control'--construing that phrase to mean the area from 
within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." Chimel 
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
11. Justice Marshall has indicated that he would regard the intent of the officers in a 
timed arrest as the controlling factor. "When an arrest is so timed that it is no more 
than an attempt to circumvent the warrant requirement, I would hold the subsequent 
arrest or search unlawful." United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 49 (1976) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). See also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 455-57. 
12. Professor Amsterdam feels that the Court has consciously chosen not to address 
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ual perspective13 by frequently emphasizing that fourth amendment 
rights are personal rights.14 The limitation perspective, however, un-
derlies the development of the fourth amendment15 and occasionally 
appears in Supreme Court opinions.16 Because decisions in fourth 
amendment cases may depend on the perspective employed by the 
court, the limitation perspective should be explicitly exainined to de-
termine its proper role in resolving fourth amendment questions.17 
This article will analyze the fourth amendment from both the indi-
vidual and limitation perspectives, and evaluate the desirability of 
each as a determinant of the reach of fourth amendment protection 
in specific situations. The individual perspective alone is an inade-
quate model to evaluate all interests relevant to fourth amendment 
problems.18 Conjunctive use of both perspectives, however, allows a 
complete and balanced analysis of the fourth amendment, and can 
eliminate the need to ponder such difficult questions as which expec-
tations of privacy are socially justifiable and when an individual has 
waived his privacy rights. Although an accommodation between the 
the question of whether the fourth amendment should be viewed from the individual 
or limitation perspective. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 352-53. 
13. The concepts of "standing" and ''taint" of a constitutional violation are largely 
r.remised upon the individual perspective. Chief Justice Burger recently noted that 
'[b) oth these limitations on the use of the exclusionary rule are inconsistent with its 
deterrent rationale." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 421 n.4 (1977) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). Although the Chief Justice was specifically concerned with the exclusion-
ary rule, the Court has invoked the "standing" requirement when the target seeks a 
remedy other than exclusion of evidence to protect his privacy from general surveil-
lance. See, e.g. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S.1 (1972). "[Mlany times the Court has denied 
standing and limited the scope of the amendment by saying that the defendant's 
fourth amendment rights are not involve.d when it really meant that the exclusionary 
rule would not be applied or the search and seizure was reasonable." Knox, Some 
Thoughts on the Scope of the Fourth Amendment and Standing to Challenge Searches 
and Seizures, 40 Mo. L. REV. 1, 47 (1975). See also note 192 infra. 
The Supreme Court has been more willing to adopt the limitation perspective when 
it causes contraction of fourth amendment protections. E.g. South Dakota v. Opper-
man, 425 U.S. 909 (1976); Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). In such cases the Court 
"limits the requirement of a warrant to the small number of cases in which govern-
ment officials plan to initiate contact with the person for the primary purpose of mak-
ing a search." Weinreb, supra note 2, at 79 (emphasis added). See alsoBacigal, The 
Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendmen~ 9 U. Rica. L. REV. 249 (1975); notes 
224-311 infra and accompanyin~ text. 
14. See, e.g. Alderman v. Umted States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). 
15. See notes 194-204 infra and accompanying text. 
16. See, e.g. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971) (warrantless 
search of car held unreasonable because police had ample opportunity to obtain war-
rant, knew in advance the car's precise location, and intended to seize it when they 
entered the property}; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 319 (1971) (caseworker's home 
visit held not an unreasonable intrusion under the fourth amendment, because the 
investigatory technique was "a gentle means, of limited extent and of practical and 
considerate application"). 
17. Althou~h volumes have been written on the fourth amendment as perceived 
from the individual perspective, see notes 37-44 infra, the limitation perspective has 
been almost ignored. But see Dworkin, supra note 2; Mascolo, The Ro1e of Functional 
Observation in the Law of Search and Seizure: A Study in Misconception, 71 DICK. L. 
REV. 379 (1967). 
18. Considering the limitation perspective as a distinct, theoretical alternative to the 
privacy analysis, however, does bring to light interests that the individual privacy ap-
proach ignores: society's interest in controlling secret agents, for example. See notes 
146-73 infra and accompanying text. 
,,.n1 
two perspectives is desirable, the latter part of this article disregards 
questions of individual rights in order to develop a tentative model 
exemplifying the use of the limitation perspective in fourth amend-
ment problems. 
The Individual Perspective: The Right to Privacy and the 
Myth of Assumption of Risk 
The individual perspective has dominated the history and develop-
ment of the fourth amendment. The history of the fourth amend-
ment can be traced to the Magna Charta, 19 Roman law, and the 
Bible.20 The individual right enjoying the longest and strongest sup-
port is the right to property, especially property rights in a dwelling 
house.21 The Supreme Court employed the fourth amendment to ex-
pand this concept to protect personal and property security in "con-
stitutionally protected area [ s] .22 Prior to Katz v. United States,23 the 
Court limited the scope of the amendment's protection to certain spe-
cial places.24 This emphasis on property and physical trespass25 
culminated in Olmstead v. United States,26 in which the Court held 
that a wiretap of private telephone lines did not violate the fourth 
amendment because the telephone messages were not tangible prop-
erty that could be seized.27 Absent physical entry into a constitu-
tionally protected place, no entry and thus no search occurred.28 
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, criticized the majority for emphasizing 
property rights and for ignoring the individual's right to be free from 
19. Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States (pt. 1), 3 U. RICH. L. REV. 278, 281 (1968). 
20. ''The famous maxim 'every man's house is his castle' cited by Coke, 5 Rep. 92, 
and generally regarded as a peculiarly English privile~e, comes directly from the Ro-
man law. Nemo de domo sua extrahi debet But ... it would seem that the concept 
far antedates that body of law." N. LAssoN, THE HlsTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 15 n.9 (1937). The author 
traces the concept to Hebrew law and.the Bible. Id at 13-14. Lord Pitt, opposing gen-
eral warrants, probably made the most famous statement regarding the sanctity of a 
dwelling house: 
The poorest man mar., in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces of the 
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the 
storm may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of England may not enter; 
all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement. 
Quoted in·id at 49-50. . 
21. The "hue and cry" whereby all able-bodied males were to join in the search for 
the criminal was one of the earliest forms of official search in Anglo-Saxon jurispru-
dence. But even while in hot ~ursuit, the search party had to proceed cautiously onto a 
man's curtilage, due to the high regard for the owner's privilege to be undisturbed in 
the peaceful occupancy of his home. Stengel, supra note 19, at 280. See also 
Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 note c (K.B. 1604). 
22. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (opinion by Justice Stewart). 
One year later Justice Stewart declared in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 
(1967), that the fourth amendment "protects people not places." 
23. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
24. See, e.g, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (automobiles); Stoner v. Califor-
nia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel rooms); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (ga-
rages); Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877) (sealed packages). 
25. ''The law of search and seizure has been interwoven, in historical context, with 
the requirement of trespassory intrusion. Attaching to the search process the require-
ment of a trespassory intrusion of necessity elinlinates therefrom all activity that does 
not involve or include such intrusion." Mascolo, supra note 17, at 414. 
26. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
27. Id at 466. 
28. Id at 464. 
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Criticism of Olmstead intensified as the years passed.30 The Court 
subsequently extended the amendment's protection to such in-
tangibles as conversations,31 and eventually overruled Olmstead and 
abandoned the physical trespass requirement in Katz v. United 
States.32 Katz held that electronic surveillance of a person in a tele-
phone booth violated the privacy on which the person justifiably re-
lied and thus violated the fourth amendment's prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizure.33 If the Court in Katz had held 
only that physical trespass is unnecessary to fourth amendment vio-
lations,34 the error of Olmstead would have been corrected and the 
courts would have continued to concern themselves with defining a 
"constitutionally protected area." Katz not only determined the 
means by which the fourth amendment may be violated, but also ex-
amined the scope of the amendment. The short an~wer given in 
Katz-that the amendment "protects people, not places"35-is only 
the starting point for analysis and not the answer itself.36 The major-
ity opinion failed to delineate the contours of the right of privacy or 
29. Mr. Justice Brandeis stated: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to 
the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the si~cance of man's spiritual 
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They- knew that only a part of the 
pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. 
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emo-
tions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the 
right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by 
the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means em-
ployed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Id at 478. Justice Brandeis' invocation of a right to be let alone and his attack upon 
the view that the fourth amendment :protects only property resurrected the prior broad 
view of the amendment enunciated m Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
30. See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. 
CT. REV. 212, 218-35. . 
31. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). · 
32. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). "[O)nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures, it 
becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or 
absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id at 353. See also 
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961). One commentator has suggested 
that the right to privacy reco~ed in Katz is itself a "notion drawn largely from prop-
erty law" that has "imported mto search and seizure anomalous rigidities derived from 
private property law." Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows 
on the Fourth Amendmen~ 28 U. Cm. L. REV. 664, 666-67 (1961). See also note 34 infra. 
33. 389 U.S. at 353. 
34. Commentators have noted that despite Justice Stewart's pronouncement in 
Katzthat the fourth amendment "protects people not places," courts remain preoccu-
pied with physical privacy and constitutionally protected areas. See Amsterdam, 
supra note 5, at 383; Dutile, Some Observations on the Supreme Court's Use of Property 
Concepts in Resolving Fourth Amendment Problems, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 1 (1971); Wein-
reb, supra note 2, at 52-54. 
35. See note 22 supra. 
36. 389 U.S. at 351. One writer has suggested that the Katz opinion is "intentionally 
ambiguous, pointing the war to a new scope for the Fourth Amendment while leaving 
the Court room to retreat.' Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth 
Amendmen~ 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 133, 138. See also Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 385 
(''the Katz decision was written to resist captivation in any formula"). 
1A7Rl 
explain when and why an individual is justified in relying on this 
right. 
Despite the warning in Katz that ''the Fourth Amendment cannot 
be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,' "37 fourth 
amendment litigation since Katz has centered on the privacy issue.38 
The origin and constitutional basis of the right to privacy are un-
clear, 39 and articulation of the scope and content of the right has 
proved extremely diffi.cult.40 Courts have invoked the privacy right 
in several areas outside the fourth amendment,41 but attempts by so-
cial scientists42 and the courts43 to define the right have been unsuc-
cessful. Definitional problems may arise because the right to 
privacy is not one right but many discrete rights, some of which are 
interrelated, while others are unrelated or inconsistent.44 
Even a clear definition of privacy45 would not determine the extent 
to which constitutional protection is desirable or the weight to be as-
signed to the privacy right in competition with other social and politi-
cal values. The Court has recently rejected an absolutist view of 
privacy by declining to place certain items of evidentiary value be-
yond the reach of a search that meets the procedural requirements of 
the fourth amendment.46 Thus, any privacy interest47 might be out-
37. 389 U.S. at 350. 
38. One comment observes that "[t]he greatest misfortunes befalling the right of 
privacy as a constitutional doctrine are its name and birth." Doss & Doss, On Morals, 
Privacy, and the Constitution, 25 U. MIAMI L. REV. 395, 418 (1971). But ef.Beaney, supra 
note 30, at 215: ''The nearest to an explicit recognition of a right to privacy in the Con-
stitution is contained in the Fourth Amendment." 
39. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L. REV. 219, 228-29 
(1965). 
40. "[T]he content of the right remains elusive, the constitutional sources from 
which it springs are vaguely charted, and the remedies for its vindication remain 
largely ephemeral." Hufstedler, The Directions and Misdirections of a Constitutional 
Right of Privacy, 26 REC. N.Y.B.A. 546, 547 (1971). 
41. E.g. Rowe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973) (abortion); Rowan v. United States 
Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970) (pandering advertisement); Kovacs v. 
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-89 (1949) (sound trucks). See generally Doss & Doss, supra note 
38; Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960). 
42. A. WESTIN, PruvACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967). 
43. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970). 
44. E.g. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732-33 (1961) (absence of chilling 
effect on free speech and press); A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 7 (the right "of individu-
als, grou:ps, or mstitutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others"); Dykstra, "The Right Most Valued 
by Civilized Man," 6 UTAH L. REV. 305, 307 (1959) (''mental and spiritual 
development ••• happiness, peace of mind, the proper unfolding of personality"); Er-
vin, The Final Answer: The People in Control, 7 TRIAL 14, 28 (March/April 1971) (free-
dom from "a climate of apprehension and fear of 'snoopers'-private or official"); 
Parker, Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275, 280 (1974) ("control over who can 
sense us"); Rossiter, The Pattern of Liberty, in AsPECTS OF LIBERTY 17 (M. Konvitz & C. 
Rossiter eds. 1958) (the right to "erect an unbreachable wall of digruty and reserve 
against the entire world"). 
45. ''The legal process places limits on the sublety and sophistication of the defini-
tions it uses •••• [T]he law needs some short, commonly agreed upon definition of 
privacy." Parker, supra note 44, at 277-78. 
46. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). Andresen raised the question left 
open in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967): "whether there are items of evidential 
value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search 
and seizure." Id at 303. Andresen apparently answers this question in the negative 
by holding that a search and seizure is constitutional when the government observes 
the procedural requirements of the fourth amendment and avoids compulsion under 
the fifth amendment by ensuring that ''the individual against whom the search is di-
rected is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incrimi-
nating evidence." 427 U.S. at 474. 
47. The broad language of Andresenimplies that no items, even personal diaries, are 
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weighed by a competing governmental interest, such as the govern-
ment's interest in ferreting out crime. 
Shifting emphasis from a pure individual perspective to an analysis 
integrating both perspectives would make the determinations in par-
ticular cases less complex. Balancing recognized privacy rights 
against other interests48 as dictated by the integrated approach re-
quires the government to establish probable cause for intruding upon 
a recognized right to privacy.49 The prior and more difficult task re-
quired by Katz, however, is balancing interests to determine whether 
the expectation of privacy is justified.50 If the expectation is not jus-
tified, the fourth amendment is inapplicable and an inquiry into 
probable cause is unnecessary.51 Although the Katz majority failed 
to explain why the defendant had ''justifiably relied" on the privacy 
of the telephone booth and to delineate standards for a justifiable ex-
pectation of privacy,52 Justice Harlan, concurring, suggested that the 
expectation of privacy must be both subjective and reasonable.53 
The Court soon abandoned the subjective expectation requirement, 
because the individual defendant is unlikely to have considered the 
privacy question,54 and currently employs only the reasonable expec-
tation test to determine the applicability of the fourth amendment.55 
A standard for justifiable or reasonable expectation of privacy re-
mains unelucidated. Courts should not entrust this determination to 
the jury because jurors are generally unfamiliar with police search 
and seizure practices.56 The reasonable man standard is also trouble-
some in this context because it often requires the fact-finder to hy-
pothesize about the expectations of the reasonable criminal and to 
consider the defendant's illegal activity in determining whether an 
so private that they are beyond the search and seizure powers of the government. The 
items seized in Andresen were business records, however, and thus the status of per-
sonal diaries remains uncertain. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the 
Court stated: "Special problems of privacy which might be presented by subpoena of a 
personal diary ... are not involved here." Id at 401 n.7. 
48. See Ervin, supra note 44, at 28 (suggesting that efficiency and economy values 
should be balanced with privacy and constitutional freedom values). · 
49. See, e.g, Wong Sun v. United States, 371U.S.471 (1963); Malloryv. United States, 
354 U.S. 449 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
50. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text. 
51. See e.g, United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 
1135 (1974). Once the court classifies the government action as a "nonsearch," meaning 
that no intrusion upon interests protected by the fourth amendment has occurred, "it 
is of course of no consequence whether or not there was probable cause." 484 F .2d at 
380 n.5. 
52. Katz "offers neither a comprehensive test of fourth amendment coverage nor 
any positive principles by which questions of coverage can be resolved." Amster-
dam, supra note 5, at 385. 
53. 389 U.S. at 361. 
54. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971). 
55. Id Even Harlan had second thoughts about the requirement for a subjective 
expectation of privacy that he had suggested in Katz. Id at 786 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). 
56. See Dworkin, supranote 2, at 365-66. 
1Q7Al 
expectation of privacy is reasonable.57 These problems induced the 
Court to state that "one contemplating illegal activities must realize 
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police."58 This 
position imposes a required expectation on wrongdoers rather than 
reflecting what they actually or reasonably expect. The result is a 
moral judgment that wrongdoers are not justified in expecting pri-
vacy.59 
Even if courts could resist the temptation to invoke moral justifica-
tions, the major inadequacy of exclusive reliance on the reasonably 
prudent man standard is that the standard merely reflects existing 
conditions without considering their desirability.60 The government 
can unilaterally change existing conditions and thus the expectations 
of reasonably prudent men.61 If the fourth amendment is to protect 
the right to privacy at all, it must consider what citizens have-a right 
to expect rather than society's current expectations. A public opin-
ion poll cannot define social justification and reasonable expectation. 
Courts must assess the effect that the government activity would 
have on individuals and society absent constitutional restraints.62 
The Katz test thus requires a court to determine which privacy 
claims will receive fourth amendment protection rather than what 
the individual subjectively expects, or what the reasonably prudent 
man expects.63 Deciding which interests are protected by the fourth 
amendment requires a value judgement and thus requires courts to 
determine which expectations of privacy are desirable and therefore 
justifiable.64 When a court addresses these questions, satisfactory 
57. Another obvious temptation is to consider the effect of the exclusionary rule in 
determining whether the fourth amendment protections apply. See generally Huf-
stedler, supra note 40. 
58. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 752 (emphasis added). By focusing on the 
expectations of one contemplating illegal activities the analysis begs the question "by 
usmg a later determination of criminaliW to justify the government's earlier activity 
which made the determination possible.' Dworkin, supra note 2, at 337. 
59. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 337. 
60. The task of the law is ''to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect," and the 
Court should not "merely recite the expectations and risks without examining the de-
sirability of saddling them upon society." United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 786 
(Harlan, J., dissenting). 
61. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 384. See, e.g. United States v. Doran, 482 F.2d 929, 
932 (9th Cir. 1973), holding that because the government had posted signs informing 
passengers that they would be searched before boarding an airplane, an individual 
choosing to board a :plane relinquished any.reasonable expectation that he would not 
be searched. C.f.Uruted States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 (9th Cir.1973) ("The govern-
ment could not avoid the restrictions of the Fourth Amendment by notifying the pub-
lic that all telephone lines would be tapped, or that all homes would be searched."). 
62. Stone, supra note 2, at 1219. 
63. Of course even before Katz the courts had to choose which places and things 
were within the coverage of the fourth amendment. Determining the existence of a 
right of privacy in tangible things was not as difficult as the present question, however, 
because the courts had recourse to longstanding property principles. While property 
rights in intangibles are also recognized by property law, such rights are not as clearly 
defined by legal precedent. When the Katz opinion announced that the fourth amend-
ment protects people not places, see note 22 supra, thus necessitating a determination 
of what privacy people may justifiably expect, the courts had no ready reservoir of 
precedents to guide them. Commentators have suggested various tests, see, e.g, 
Kitch, supranote 36, at 137 ("society's generally shared expectations"); Parker, supra 
note 44, at 276 ("our shared intuition of when privacy is or is not gained or lost"); Stone 
supra note 2, at 1212 (concern with ''relatively serious" threats to privacy); Weinreb, 
supra note 2, at 83 (claims that are "natural or essential"). 
64. This ''uncomfortable position" of iden~g basic rights and desirable social 
values is not unique to fourth amendment Jurisprudence. According to Justice 
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answers are unlikely because the court must choose between the 
equally important social interests in the right of privacy and the need 
for effective law enforcement. As long as courts are forced to choose 
one of these values over the other, fourth amendment law will remain 
unsettled.65 
Faced with the difficult task of reconciling conflicting social values, 
courts have abrogated their responsibility by applying an irregular 
version of the assumption of risk doctrine. The courts have created 
the fiction that the individual determines which expectations of pri-
vacy are desirable and therefore deserving of fourth amendment pro-
tection. Reasoning that the right to privacy can be waived, courts 
routinely conclude that an individual did not want privacy in a given 
situation.66 This analysis obviates speculation on the existence of 
the right had the defendant actually sought it. Under this formula-
tion, the issue resembles a consent or waiver determination.67 The 
courts have eschewed traditional requirements for waiver or consent, 
however, and have created a peculiar version of the assumption of 
risk doctrine. 
This article will analyze the Court's decisions using the assumption 
of risk doctrine in three factual settings involving the following hypo-
thetical situation: John and Mary have an. adulterous relationship. 
John wishes to conceal this relationship from his spouse, respectable 
society, and especially the government, because adultery is a crime. 
To protect the secrecy of this "private" relationship, John never ap-
pears with Mary in public. Their contact is confined to telephone 
conversations and meetings in an isolated mountain cabin, to w:pjch 
they come and go separately~ They never appear outside the cabin 
together. John is arrested and prosecuted for adultery. 
John is dismayed to find that the government will offer the follow-
ing evidence: (1) testimony that government observation of John for 
the past year demonstrates that he made twenty trips from his home 
to the cabin; (2) testimony by a government forest ranger who has 
Holmes, the judicial function necessarily and properly involves "considerations of 
what is expedient for the community concerned.' 0. W. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAw 35 
(1923). See, e.g. Mitchell v. State, 120 Ga. App. 447, 170 S.E.2d 765 (1969), where the 
court balanced the public's interest in apprehending defendants engaging in homosex-
ual activities in public restrooms against the individual's interest in not being watched 
while relieving himself. The court held that the interest in privacy must be 
"subordinated to the_public interest in law enforcement." Id at 447, 170 S.E.2d at 766. 
65. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1950). While a certain amount of ''unstable equilibrium" may be 
viewed as the virtue of flexibility, "consistency and predictability are virtues too, and 
they must be sacrificed to achieve flexibility." Dworkin, supra note 2, at 365. Undue 
emphasis on flexibility and the factual setting of each case undermines the fourth 
amendment as a means of regulating the police, since police officers cannot be ex-
pected to conform their conduct to unannounced, unpredictable norms. See notes 246-
49 infra and accompanying text. See generally Dworkin, supra note 2; LaFave, supra 
note 4. 
66. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 183 (1969). 
67. See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 54. 
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observed, through an unshuttered window, John and Mary engaging 
in sexual relations inside the cabin (the forest ranger made these ob-
servations through infrared binoculars from a nearby mountain 
which is part of a government park); (3) John's diary, containing en-
tries concerning his relationship with Mary, seized during a search of 
the cabin (government agents conducted the search after obtaining 
the consent of John's business partner, who shared use of the cabin 
with John); (4) tapes of John and Mary's telephone conversations ob-
tained using a wiretap, without court authorization, but with Mary's 
consent; and (5) Mary's testimony about John's bedroom conversa-
tions with her, Mary disclosing that she has been an undercover po-
lice agent since the age of nine. 
John may be dismayed at the government's efficiency in collecting 
this evidence. He may be further dismayed to learn that all of the 
evidence is probably admissible. But he will be stunned to learn 
that it is admissible because he is deemed to have no desire that 
these matters be private. Notwithstanding his subjective desire for 
privacy, and the reasonableness of the precautions he took to conceal 
his relationship with Mary, the court will inform him that he waived 
any claim of privacy and assumed the risk that he was under govern-
ment surveillance, that the ranger would look through his unshut-
tered window, that his business partner would consent to a seizure of 
his diary, that Mary would consent to a wiretap, and that Mary was 
actually a government spy. 
Private and Public Places 
Courts employ the distinction between private and public places to 
determine how much privacy an individual retains when he leaves a 
private place and enters a public place and how much privacy an in-
dividual retains when he "invites" the public into an otherwise pri-
vate place.68 John's use of a public highway en route to the cabin 
exemplifies the entry of a public place. His failure to shutter the 
cabin windows exemplifies an "invitation" to the public to enter a 
private place. 
Going Into Public Places 
Dicta in Katz89 and other cases70 recognizes that a person's desire for 
privacy may be constitutionally protected even in a public place. 
Nevertheless, the courts generally limit fourth amendment protec-
tion to public places ''where the physical arrangement creates an ex-
68. 389 U.S. at 351 ("What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in bis own 
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."). 
69. Id at 351-52 ("[W]hat he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessi-
ble to the public, may be constitutionally r.rotected."). 
70. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) ( 'This inestimable right of personal security 
belongs as much to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted 
in his study to dispose of his secret affairs."); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 
(1977) ("a fundamental purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals 
from unreasonable government invasions of legitimate privacy interests, and not sim-
ply those interests found inside the four walls of the home"). 
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pectation of privacy."71 The courts have been less willing to 
determine whether the right to privacy exists in a public area lacking 
the physical characteristics of private places.72 Terry v. Ohfo73 es-
tablished that an individual retains some privacy in his person and 
tangible property even while on a public street. The stop and frisk 
procedure considered by the Court in Terry also constitutes a tres-
pass and a seizure under the "means-oriented" approach of 
Olmstead.74 Under Olmstead, the fourth amendment does not apply 
absent a physical trespass.75 The Katz ''justifiable expectation of 
privacy" approach, on the other hand, fails to indicate unambigu-
ously whether the fourth amendment applies to governmental activi-
ties that do not constitute a physical trespass, such as surveillance in 
public places. Many courts76 and commentators77 have concluded 
that the constitution does not reach all acts of public surveillance by 
the government. 
The Court suggested in Katz, however, that physical trespass is 
unnecessary to place public searches within the fourth amendment. 
The test for a justifiable expectation of privacy is whether a particu-
lar expectation is desirable in this society, not what the reasonably 
prudent man,78 or a specific individual, expects.79 This value judg-
71. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 84. See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal 3d 884, 891-92, 506 
P.2d 232, 236-37, 106 Cal Rptr. 408, 412-13 (1973) (expectation of privacy in public rest-
room despite doorless toilet stall); ef.Kirsch v. State, 10 Md. App. 565, 569, 271A.2d770, 
772 (1970) (no expectation of privacy in locked service station restroom). Katz speaks 
of the defendant excluding the uninvited ear by closing the door. 389 U.S. at 352. Re-
garding the right to privacy in public restroom compartments see generally 55 MINN. L. 
REV. 1255 (1971); 19 VAND. L. REV. 945 (1966); 63 COLUM. L. REV. 955 (1963). 
72. E.g, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (Army information-gathering ''relating to 
potential or actual civil disturbances or street demonstrations"); Giancana v. Hoover, 
322 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1963); Scherer v. Brennan, 266 F. Supp. 758 (N.D. ID. 1966), afj'd, 
379 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1967). Although the Supreme Court has recognized an mdivid-
ual's ''right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own 
home," Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969), ''the Court did not explain why the 
situs •.• made an~ difference in the state's power to interfere with [the individual's} 
satisfying his emotional needs or in its power to tell him what he should read or view. ' 
Hufstedler, supra note 40, at 560. 
73. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
74. See notes 19-29 supra and accompanying text. 
75. 277 U.S. at 464; see Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765) 
("[T]he eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass."), quoted inBoyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-29 (1886). Contra, United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 
313 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting) ("In every-day talk, as of 1789 or now, a man 
'searches' when he looks or listens."), aff'd, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
76. E.g, Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385, 388 (8th Cir. 1964) ("[I)t is not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to observe in a public place that 
which is apparent for all the world to see."), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 984 (1965). 
77. "Surely, an individual cannot reasonably expect to be free from observation. It 
seems unassailable that the courts will always affirm what the logic here de-
mands-that a police officer be allowed, indeed be expected, to patrol and· observe 
what transpires in areas fully open to the public." Belair & Bock, Police Use of Remote 
Camera Systems for Surveillance of Public Streets, 4 CoLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV.143, 
191 (1972). See Christie, Government Surveillance and Individual Freedom, 47 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 871, 889 n.78 (1972) (proposing statutory rather than constitutional limitations 
on surveillance). 
78. See text accompanying notes 56-62 supra. 
79. See text accompanying note 55 supra. 
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ment requires balancing society's need for information80 against the 
harm of placing surveillance beyond fourth amendment coverage. 
The individual perspective indicates that surveillance interferes with 
the right of privacy if privacy encompasses the concept of anonymity. 
The concept of anonymity recognizes that most people spend part 
of their lives in public.81 Although some observation is inevitable in 
public places, the individual observed nevertheless distinguishes be-
tween systematic surveillance and casual observation.82 In an urban 
society, therefore, anonymity replaces privacy. The urbanite merges 
into the "situational landscape."83 Although surveillance of the indi-
vidual qua individual clearly destroys anonymity, the social costs of 
this destruction are unclear. Everyone has probably experienced 
the vague, uneasy feeling of being watched, especially when he is un-
able to watch his observer contemporaneously. This feeling is obvi-
ously undesirable.84 The inquiry required by Katz, however, is 
whether the social 'effects of surveillance are sufficiently undesirable 
to invoke fourth amendment protection.85 This question may not 
have a satisfactory answer, but the Supreme Court has evaded it alto-
gether by invoking such devices as standing86 and assumption of risk. 
The Court has reasoned that a citizen leaving a private place to 
enter a public place relinquishes his expectation of privacy because 
he has consciously chosen to encounter the risk of observation.87 
This determination that an individual voluntarily chose to encoun-
ter the risk of observation differs substantially from a determination 
that the fourth amendment guarantees no right to anonymity in pub-
lic. A court must infer the individual's decision to encounter obser-
vation from the ·factual circumstances in each case, whereas the 
conclusion that no right to anonymity exists is a legal, not factual, 
conclusion. The Court's assumption of risk reasoning thus fails to 
address the real issue.as 
80. See McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 193, 204; 
Christie, supra note 17, at 887. 
81. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 81. · 
82. Id at 81-82. 
83. A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 31. 
84. "Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in public places 
destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek in open spaces and public 
arenas." Id Under the individual perspective the psychological effects of the fear of 
surveillance can exist independent of actual surveillance. ''The fear of governmental 
voyeurism is thought to be almost as destructive of personality as would be a physical 
intrusion." Hufstedler, supra note 40, at 559. 
85. See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 83. The author obs!'!rves: 
It is risky business to speculate how human beings will adapt to a changed 
environment. Without being very precise, experience suggests that if we were 
to lose the cloak of anonymity in public places, we should be less open, more 
crafty, mor-e secretive, and more isolated than we are now. There is no way to 
establish that our behavior now is better (more "natural," or more "human," 
or more pleasant) than it would be if we expected and had less privacy. In the 
end we must rely on an unproved vision of man in society. 
86. See note 13, supra 
87. See, e.g., Connor v. Hutto, 516 F.2d 853, 855 (8th Cir.) (right of privacy does not 
extend to commission of an act of sodomy in a car parked on a public highway), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975); Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 1113-14 (1st Cir. 1974) 
(right of privacy may be surrendered on public disp,lay; it does not extend to "conduct 
displayed under the street lamp on the front lawn'). 
88. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 406. One commentator has suggested that estop-
pel, rather than assumption of risk, is the appropriate doctrine when an individual's 
conduct evidences an indifference to privacy. Stone, supra note 2, at 1217. 
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The Court has also misconstrued the traditional doctrine of as-
sumption of risk, which requires that the defendant voluntarily en-
counter89 a known and appreciated risk.90 Even if an individual 
knows and appreciates the risk of surveillance whenever he goes out 
in public, he has not voluntarily encountered the danger as required 
by traditional assumption of risk principles. The voluntary choice 
requirement of traditional assumption of risk analysis assumes the 
presence of at least one alternative to the risk chosen.91 If the alter-
native to surveillance is reasonable and the defendant rejects it, he 
has chosen voluntarily to be the subject of surveillance. If the indi-
vidual has no reasonable alternative to surveillance, however, he has 
not made a voluntary choice. Choice in the absence of reasonable al-
ternatives is tantamount to duress.92 Thus, voluntariness of choice, 
an essential element of assumption of risk, depends upon the rea-
sonableness of the alternatives facing the individual at the time of his 
choice.93 Thus, assumption of risk analysis is inappropriate in 
resolving fourth amendment questions unless individuals have a rea-
sonable alternative to appearing in public places. 
The only citizens who have any alternative to appearing in public 
places are those wealthy enough to live exclusively in private places. 
All other citizens are incapable of assuming the risk of surveillance 
89. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Winder, 340 S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) (after 
knowledge and appreciation have been established "[t]here yet remains the issue as 
to whether the [individual] voluntarily exposed himself to the danger known and ap-
preciated by him."); RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS§ 496E (1965). 
90. City of Winona v. Botzet, 169 F. 321, 329 (8th Cir. 1909) ("Notice or knowledge and 
appreciation of the danger are indispensable to the assumption of the risk."); RESTATE-
MENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D (1965). 
91. See Note, Distinctions Between Assumption of Risk and Contributory Negli-
gence, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 91, 99 (1966). 
92. Smith v. United States, 153 F.2d 655, 661 (5th Cir. 1946) (''To constitute duress it 
is sufficie!lt if ~e will b~, constrained by the unlawful presentation of a choice between 
comparative evils . . • • ) • 
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496E (2) (1965); see also Dougherty v. Chas. 
H. Tompkins Co., 240 F.2d 34, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (decision to use snowy temporary 
sidewalk was not assumption of risk because no reasonable alternative was available); 
Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions-Special Issue 
Submission in Texa.s; 33 TEx. L. REV. 1, 14 (1954). But see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218 (1973): ''When, for example threats are used, the situation is one of choice 
between alternatives, either one disagreeable, to be sure, but still subject to a choice. 
As between the rack and a confession, the latter would usually be considered the less 
disagreeable; but it is nonetheless a voluntary choice." Id at 224 n.7 (quoting 3 J. 
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 826 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970) ). The traditional British view has 
been that "a man cannot be said to be truly 'willing' unless he is in a position to choose 
freely, and freedom of choice predicates • . . the absence from his mind of any feeling 
of constraint so that nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will." Bowater v. 
Rowley Regis Corp., [1944] 1 K.B. 476, 479. 
For an interesting discussion of how the lack of reasonable alternatives affects sub-
stantive law, see Doss & Doss, supra note 38, noting that certain conduct can be pro-
scribed as criminal because the individual has reasonable alternatives to engaging in 
such conduct. For example, when public drunkenness is made a crime, "(a] man can 
be drunk at home or in his club, and he can drink more moderately in other public 
places .••. " Id at 417 n.123. But laws proscribing the establishment or maintenance 
of poly~amous households unduly limit the individual's ri~ht to be left alone because 
the individual has no choice between reasonable alternatives. "A communal fainily 
can either live together-or it can dissolve. There are no alternatives." Id 
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because they have no alternative.94 The life of a total recluse, even if 
economically feasible, may nevertheless be unreasonable.95 The loss 
of freedom from even self-imposed seculsion to avoid surveillance96 
may be too costly. If a completely private life is not a reasonable 
alternative, the individual going out in public has not made a volun-
tary choice to assume the risk of surveillance. The assumption of 
risk doctrine, properly applied, would not divest individuals of their 
rights as quickly as the courts' present version of the doctrine. Prop-
erly applied, the assumption of risk doctrine would force the courts to 
decide the social policy questions that they currently avoid when de-
termining what constitutes a justifiable expectation of privacy. To 
determine whether an _expectation of privacy is justifiable, the courts 
must decide whether society will recognize some right to anonymity 
in public places. Traditional assumption of risk analysis, however, 
would require the courts to determine whether living exclusively in 
private places is a reasonable (socially acceptable) alternative to ap-
pearing in public. Thus, if the assumption of risk doctrine were 
properly applied the courts would gain little in their effort to avoid 
ruling on social policy issues. The courts should abandon superficial 
assumption of risk analysis when considering questions of privacy in 
public places, and in fourth amendment cases generally. Assump-
tion of risk only confuses the area and contributes nothing to an un-
derstanding of the fourth amendment.97 
Inviting the Public into a Private Place 
An individual cannot necessarily create an expectation of privacy by 
locating himself beyond visual observation.98 The fourth amendment 
94. Many poor people are forced to conduct their social lives on the street. PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHAL-
LENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 104 (1967) (citing dilapidated and overcrowded 
'housing, inadequate recreational facilities). Making the right to privacy turn on one's 
standard of living may violate equal protection. Professor Weinreb suggests that tying 
the right of privacy to private property may require that the government provide pri-
vate ''places" to those who cannot afford them. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 84-85. 
95. The privacy and life style of a Howard Hughes type may be unappealing even to 
those who possess the requisite financial resources. Nevertheless, assets determine 
one's potential for privacy. A typical middle-class individual may not be able to afford 
to charter a private plane or seal off an entire floor of a hotel, but he can afford to join a 
country club or use a union hall. The availability of such places to those with ade-
quate financial resources leads to a basic feeling that we can retire to these places 
when we want realprivacy. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 404. 
96. Id at 402. 
97. As used by the Court, assumption of risk "is not a reason but a conclusion. The 
public assumes that risk because the law says it is a risk the public must assume." 
Note, The Applicability of the ''New" Fourth Amendment to Investigatio7JS by Secret 
Agents: A Proposed Delineation of the Emerging Fourth Amendment Right to Privacy, 
45 WASH. L. REV. 785, 809 (1970). 
98. See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976), in which the Court held that 
defendant had no justifiable expectation of privacy when she was standing on the 
threshold of the entrance to her home. Defendant had retreated into her house when 
the police arrived and attempted to arrest her. The police made the arrest inside the 
house "in hot pursuit" of defendant. The Court reasoned: 
542 
While it may be true that under the common law of property the threshold of 
one's dwelling is ''private," as is the yard surrounding the house, it is nonethe-
less clear that unaer the cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment I the de-
fendant] was in a ''public" place. She was not in an area where she :had any 
expectation of privacy . . • • She was not merely visible to the puolic but was 
exposed to puolic view, speech, hearing, and touch as if she had been standing 
completely outside her house. 
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does not protect what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even 
in his own home or office.99 A person relinquishes all expectations of 
privacy in an otherwise private place by knowingly and voluntarily 
inviting all comers to enter or view that place.10° Courts disagree 
whether this relinquishment rests on consent or on waiver.101 Con-
sent and waiver both emphasize the individual's state of mind, but 
differ in other important respects.1°2 Courts determine the exist-
ence of both largely by the individual's state of mind and the pres-
ence of fraud or deception.103 
Analysis under both the waiver and consent theories proceeds 
from the premise that the defendant voluntarily relinquished a pre-
existing right to privacy. Both theories assume that the individual 
has complete control over his right to privacy and that the govern-
ment can justify intrusion only by establishing the individual's con-
sent to the intrusion. Katz, however, rendered questions of consent, 
waiver, and individual control unnecessary to a resolution of the pri-
vacy issue. Katz eliminated the necessity for the government to 
show a waiver of privacy by the defendant by requiring the individual 
to demonstrate that his claim to privacy is socially justifiable. 
Courts must bestow fourth amendment protection by determining 
which expectations of privacy are justifiable and desirable in society. 
They have evaded this determination by substituting conclusions 
about assumption of risk.104 Thus courts announce that unless the 
individual takes actions such as drawing his curtains,1°5 building a 
fence,106 and boarding up a garage,107 he has assumed the risk of ob-
servation.108 By applying assumption of risk analysis to the hypo-
thetical lovers, a court could conclude that John did not really want 
to be free from observation when he engaged in sexual activities with 
Id at 42. 
99. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351. 
100. The fourth amendment does not restrict the conduct of government officials 
who enter an area open to the public in order to conduct a visual inspection of the 
premises. United States v. Williams, 328 F.2d 887 (2nd Cir.}, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 850 
(1964); Fisherv. United States, 205 F.2d 702 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346U.S. 872 (1953). 
101. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 223-35 (1973). 
102. Waiver requires a knowing and intelligent waiver, id at 235-38, whereas con-
sent requires only voluntary consent, id at 231-34. The burden of proof also differs 
between the two theories. Id at 238 n.25. 
103. See notes 124-26 infra 
104. See notes 87-97 supra and accompanying text. 
105. See, e.g, People v. Berutko, 71 Cal. 2d 84, 453 P.2d 721, 77 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969); 
Commonwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970), cert. denied, 401 
U.S. 914 (1971). 
106. See, e.g, Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969}; People v. Wright, 41 Ill. 
2d 170, 242 N.E.2d 180 (1968). Presence of a fence is relevant to whether the area is an 
"open field" or part of the protected "curtilage,'' Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22, 25 
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 932 (1956). 
107. See, e.g, United States v. Wright, 449F.2d1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 947 (1972). 
108. See, e.g, Gil v. State, 394 S.W.2d 810, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) ("IW]here one 
is so foolish as to leave his windows unsecured he may not complam if another ob-
serves an illegal act being committed therein."). 
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Mary because he left the cottage shutters open. If John assures the 
court that he actually did desire privacy, the court could conveniently 
announce that John assumed the risk of observation. 
The traditional assumption of risk requirements, however, are not 
met in this hypothetical situation.109 The doctrine assumes a known 
and appreciated danger, but John probably failed to consider the pos-
sibility that a federal agent with infrared binoculars110 would look 
through the cabin window from a nearby mountain top. The court 
should also consider John's alternatives to risking visual observation. 
The superficial answer, that John has the reasonable alternative of 
closing his shutters whenever he desires privacy,111 is unacceptable 
for several reasons. This approach implies that privacy is only 
needed or desired for brief periods or specific activities. John can 
obtain permanent privacy only by shuttering his windows at all 
times. The resulting loss of sunshine, fresh air, and mountain view is 
an unreasonable alternative to government surveillance. Even if 
John does cover the windows, however, the privacy gained is illusory 
because the government may continue to observe through cracks or 
openings in the covering.112 To guarantee one's privacy under this 
superficial approach requires an individual to block visual observa-
tion totally from both anticipated and unanticipated113 sources. 
Courts cannot reasonably tell citizens that they must take whatever 
steps are necessary to insure that absolutely no light or sound es-
capes from their premises because failure to do so subjects any emis-
sions to government seizure. An individual today can presumably 
protect himself against surveillance only "by retiring to the cellar, 
cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, ·turning off the lights 
and remaining absoulutely quiet."114 This action satisfies traditional 
109. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text. 
110. Some courts have been tempted to regard the use of technological devices as 
determinative of whether a search has occurred. See generally Belair & Bock, supra 
note 77; Dutile, supra note 34. The ''technological device" approach has not received 
much support in situations involving visual surveillance, probably because the arsenal 
of visual surveillance devices (e.g., flashlights and binoculars) cannot match the so-
phistication and variety of equipment used for auditory surveillance. See Dorsey v. 
United States, 372 F.2d 928, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("We do not think the need to employ a 
visual aid at night in the form of a flashlight converts this from lawful into unlawful 
conduct."). 
Focusing on technological devices appears to be a return to the means-oriented ap-
:proach of Olmstead and a departure from Katz, which places more emphasis on the 
mterest to be protected than on the means of violating it. On the other hand, the 
introduction of technological devices can so alter conditions in society as to drastically 
affect reasonable or justifiable expectations of privacy. See Weinreb, supra note 2, at 
82-83. 
111. See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Hemley, 216 Pa. Super. Ct. 177, 263 A2d 904 (1970), 
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971). "It was incumbent on the suspect to preserve his 
privacr from visual observation. To do that the appellees had only to curtain the win-
dows.' 216 Pa. Super. Ct. at 181-82, 263 A2d at 907. 
112. See, e.g, State v. Smith, 37 N.J. 481, 181 A2d 761, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 835 (1962). 
"Peering through a window or a crack in a door or a keyhole is not, in the abstract, 
genteel behavior, but the Fourth Amendment does not protect against all conduct un-
worthy of a good neighbor." 37 N.J. at 496, 181 A2d at 769. 
113. The city council of Bell Gardens, California, recently sought federal funding for 
a two-y-ear, two-blimp project entitled "Demonstration of a Remotely Piloted Mini-
blimp System for Law Enforcement Surveillance in an Urban Area." The blimps 
would measure 45 feet in length and 11 feet in diameter and would be armed with a 
searchlight, public-address system, and zoom lens camera. Richmond News-Leader, 
March 31, 1977, at 1, col. 1. 
114. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 402. Cf.: "I do not want my house to be walled in 
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assumption of the risk requirements only if courts regard this seclu-
sion as a reasonable alternative in a free society. If courts do not 
characterize seclusion as reasonable, they must abandon the fiction 
that the individual relinquishes his privacy voluntarily. This would 
necessitate determination of what expectations of privacy are justifi-
able and desirable in a free society. 
Third-party Consent Situations 
The law of consent is relatively clear when the police actually con-
front the person whose premises, property, or person is the subject of 
the search. The government generally concedes or the court as-
sumes that th~ individual had a justifiable expectation of pr:i,vacy.115 
The controversy then centers on whether the individual relinquished 
this expectation and gave permission for the search. In Schneckloth 
v. Bustamonte, 116 the Supreme Court stated that relinquishment of 
fourth amendment rights does not require a knowing and intelligent 
waiver, but merely voluntary consent, to be determined by examin-
ing the totality of the circumstances.117 The Schneckloth consent 
test places the courts on familiar ground in determining voluntari-
ness.118 Unfortunately, clarity disappears in third-party consent sit-
uations when the police do not directly confront the individual whose 
premises, property, or person is searched. By invoking assumption 
of risk rhetoric, courls have blurred the distinction between the ab-
sence of a justifiable expectation of privacy and the voluntary relin-
quishment of an acknowledged expectation of privacy. If, in the 
hypothetical situation, the police had asked John for permission to 
search, the courts would simply consider the voluntariness of John's 
consent. But the police confronted John's business partner, a 
coowner sharing full use of the premises. If John's partner has vol-
untarily consented to the search, the court must determine whether 
he had authority to consent to a violation of John's privacy. Underly-
ing the determination of the third party's authority is a need to deter-
on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown 
about my house as freely as possible." M. Gandhi, quoted in W. 0. DOUGLAS, THE 
ANATOMY OF LIBERTY: THE RIGHTS OF MAN WITHOUT FORCE 20-21 (1963). 
115. Of course, if no justifiable expectation of privacy existed, the court need not 
consider the question of consent because no intrusion on privacy has occurred to 
which the target must consent. The prosecution and the courts, however, are more 
accustomed to dealing with consent than with justifiable expectations of privacy. 
Thus, courts will frequently assume arguendothat the target had a justifiable expecta-
tion of privacy and then inquire whether the target voluntarily relinquished the expec-
tation. 
116. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
117. Id at 227. 
118. The Court has a long history of determining the voluntariness of a confession, 
in which the totality of circumstances includes such factors as lack of advice as to 
constitutional rights, Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 740 (1966); his lack of educa-
tion, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 567 (1958); his low intelligence, Fikes v. Alabama, 
352 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1957); the youth of the suspect, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 
(1948); and length of detention, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 230-35, 239 (1940). 
1978] 545 
mine the source of that authority, whether it is independent of or 
contingent on John's intentions and actions. 
Courts and commentators have suggested four theories to support 
the third party's authority to consent to the search. The first theory 
emphasizes apparent authority of the third party and good faith reli-
ance by the police.119A second approach, the agency theory, suggests 
that the third party stands in the shoes of the target individual and 
may exercise all powers the target individual possesses.12°'l'he physi-
cal control theory holds that a third party in physical control of the 
subject of a search has a certain amount of raw power over that sub-
ject and the target individual has a corresponding diminution of con-
troi.121 The ''fact" of physical control empowers the third party to 
consent to a search. Finally, under assumption of risk principles, the 
third party has power to consent to a search because the target indi-
vidual assumed the risk that the third party would consent.122 
These four theories attach varying weights to the target individ-
ual's action and state of mind. Because the apparent authority con-
cept evaluates the facts from the government's viewpoint, this article 
defers analysis of apparent authority to the examination of the limi-
tation perspective. At its logical extreme, apparent authority would 
permit a burglar present on and in apparent control of the premises 
to consent to a search if the police could not reasonably discover his 
status as a burglar. The police face great practical difficulties in as-
certaining the limits of apparent authority.123 If the court views the 
fourth amendment from the individual perspective, however, a po-
liceman's ignorance of the third party's actual status would not elimi-
nate the rights of the individual. 
The target individual's state of mind is determinative under the 
agency theory. If the third party has obtained all his authority di-
rectly from the target individual he is an agent of the target individ-
ual and agency law determines his actual authority.124 The police 
must demonstrate an explicit agreement by which the target individ-
ual confers power to consent on the third party before the police may 
119. E.g, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 169-72 (1974). 
120. E.g, United States v. Sferas, 210 F.2d 69, 73 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied sub nom. 
Skally v. United States, 347 U.S. 935 (1954). 
121. E.g, United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 5-7 (9th Cir. 1976), discussed at note 
130 infra. 
122. E.g, Frazierv. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 
300-03 ( 1966). 
123. Sympathy for the police officers must be kept in perspective by remembering 
"that by resorting to consent, law enforcement officials are choosing to ignore a search 
warrant. This decision not to resort to a warrant is the very thing the Supreme Court 
is seekin~ to discourage •. A court should eschew encouraging officers to avoid war-
rants, which is the clear mandate of the amendment." Mascolo, Inter-Spousal Consent 
to Unreasonable Searches and Seizures: A Constitutional Approach, 40 CONN. B.J. 351, 
363-64 (1966). See also Weinreb, supra note 2 at 64: 
The only sensible guide for the police is that they should never rely on consent 
as the basis for a search unless they must. If they do search relying on con-
sent, they should be prepared to meet a heavy burden of proof that consent 
was in fact meaningfully given. And even then, because of the difficulties of 
proof, they should expect to be told often that the search was not proper. 
124. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964) (fourth amendment rights may be 
waived "by word or deed, either directly or through an agent"). If the third party has 
his own interest in the subject of a search and seizure, then of course he may decide 
how to exercise or waive his rights. See note 140 infra. 
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justifiably rely on the third party's consent.125 Explicit delegations of 
authority are infrequent, and the agency theory rarely justifies an of-
ficer's reliance on the consent of third parties.126 Courts invoking 
agency concepts therefore rely partially on apparent authority, physi-
cal control, or assumption of risk.121 
Although the state of mind of the target individual determines the 
effectiveness of third-party consent under the agency theory, it is ir-
relevant to the physical control theory. Authority to consent under 
the physical control theory turns on the factual question of physical 
control. Raw power overrides the subjective aspects of consent. 
When a person sUITenders control of a place or object, therefore, he 
loses the power to prevent government search and seizure of the 
place or object, regardless of the terms of SUITender.128 The Court 
has viewed subjective desires to retain control over an item beyond 
physical control as "metaphysical subtleties," irrelevant to con-
sent.129 At its logical extreme, the physical control theory produces 
results more startling than the concept of apparent authority. A bur-
glar in physical control of the target individual's premises would not 
have to hide his status from the police. Although recognizing him as 
a burglar, the police could nevertheless argue that the burglar's phys-
ical control over the premises gave him actual power to consent to a 
search. Courts have failed to clarify whether physical control alone 
is sufficient to allow consent to a search.1ao 
125. See, e.g. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. at 490 (the expectation of privacy is relin-
quished when left to the "unfettered discretion" of others). 
126. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 63: "People living agreeably together usually do not 
anive at explicit, regular practices; they proceed by understandings that are most sat-
isfactory if they are imprecise, flexible, and unstated." 
127. See generally Weinreb, supra note 2. 
128. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976): 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information re-
vealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even 
if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a 
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be be-
trayed. 
129. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969). 
130. See, e.g. United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1976). In Sherwin, the 
court applied the individual capacity silver platter doctrine, see Burdeau v. McDowell, 
256 U.S. 465 (1921), and held that a search conducted by a private citizen is not within 
the coverage of the fourth amendment. 539 F.2d at 6-7. Regarding defendant's conten-
tion that a government seizure (not search) occurred when the government accepted 
control of the items from the private citizen, the court held that no seizure occurred 
because the private searcher voluntarily relinquished the objects. The owner-defend-
ant's consent, subjective intent, and expectation of privacy were all irrelevant. 
[O]nly the fact of consent [by the third party] is relevant, not whether it was 
properly authorized [by the owner] .••. 
• • . The [third party's] legal authority to approve a transfer of objects 
found in a private search has no bearing on whether his relinquishment of 
those objects to the government is coerced or voluntary. 
Id at 7. The court's statement is puzzling because its converse is also true-the pri-
vate person's voluntary relinquishment of objects found in a private search has no 
bearing on whether he has legal authority to transfer another's property to the govern-
ment. "A person's consent . . . is relevant only to the extent that he has a protected 
interest." Weinreb, supra note 2, at 54. 
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Thus, the agency and physical control theories are antithetical. 
Agency focuses wholly on the target individual's subjective intent, 
whereas physical control excludes consideration of subjective intent 
and focuses wholly on the third party's actual power.131 Although 
courts have embraced neither theory in its pure form, both concepts, 
especially physical control, are important to the assumption of risk 
theory, the current approach. Assumption of risk analysis reasons 
that one sharing possession, use, or control of property with a third 
party assumes the risk that the third party will consent to a search of 
the property.132 
Difficulties with the assumption of risk theory include defining 
"possession," "use," and "control." These terms are ambiguous even 
in their property law context,133 and the courts' efforts to free the 
fourth amendment from its property law origins have made these 
terms especially intractable.134 Even if the definitional problems 
were resolved, the connection between conferring possession, use, or 
control on a third party and conferring authority to consent to a 
search is unclear. A babysitter in exclusive control of the owner's 
premises may lawfully consent to a search of those premises, 135 but 
courts have failed to elucidate a burglar's inability to consent, even 
though he possesses the same physical control. The distinction does 
not depend on the owner's state of mind regarding a search, because 
both the babysitter and burglar may lack explicit authorization to 
consent to a search of the premises. When an owner permits a third 
The Sherwin court apparently reasoned that once the third party, legally or illegally, 
gains control over the items, the owner's privacy interest is eliminated and only the 
property interests of the owner are implicated. 539 F.2d at 8 n.10. The court further 
reasoned that because the fourth amendment protects privacy and not property ri~hts, 
the government's action did not intrude on a fourth amendment interest. Id. An indi-
vidual loses his justifiable expectation of privacy whenever he loses actual control, and 
the loss of control in Sherwin was due to the conduct of a private citizen, not the gov-
ernment. What happens after the individual loses his justifiable expectation of pri-
vacy is irrelevant to the fourth amendment. 
Although the holding in Sherwin is limited to the seizure issue, the analysis is 
equally applicable to determine whether a search has taken place. If a private person 
can eliminate another's justifiable expectation of privacy by taking control, a burglar 
can do so when he takes control of the victim's house. Only the owner's property 
interest in the dwelling remains when he has lost actual control, and under Sherwin's 
reasoning, if the burglar voluntarily consents to a search of the house the government 
has not intruded on the owner's privacy interests. Judicial acceptance of the physical 
control analysis used in Sherwin would eliminate the fourth amendment as a protec-
tion of privacy in third-party consent situations and leave the protection of privacy 
totally to the resources and ingenuity of the individual. Even though the individual 
expects privacy and takes reasonable steps to protect his privacy, if someone succeeds 
in breaching his defenses and gaining actual control, the individual thereby loses his 
expectation of privacy and the protections of the fourth amendment. See notes 112-14 
supra and accompanying text. 
131. Consent ''is a particularly open concept, which refers to both an 'internal' state 
of mind and an 'external' performance; consent is unequivocal and unquestioned only 
when it includes both." Weinreb, supra note 2, at 55. 
132. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
133. See, e.g, National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914) ("[T]here is 
no word more ambiguous in its meaning than Possession."). When the fourth amend-
ment s:p,eaks of "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, papers and 
effects, ' does the word their ''refer to 'ownership' or 'possession' or 'custody' as these 
are known to the local civil law or to something totally different?" Dutile, supra note 
34, at 2. 
134. See notes 26-41 supra and accompanying text. 
135. See People v. Misquez, 152 Cal. App. 2d 471, 479-80, 313 P.2d 206, 211 (1957) (baby-
sitter deemed to have been authorized to permit a search because she had been left 
the keys to her employer's apartment). 
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party to be present on the premises, the owner knows that he has 
partially relinquished his exclusive control over the premises to the 
third party by virtue of the third party's physical presence. This 
knowing surrender of control distinguishes the babysitter from the 
burglar. Unlike the theory of physical control, assumption of risk 
principles do not apply when the owner involuntarily loses control to 
third parties. Courts invoke the assumption of risk doctrine only 
when the owner has knowlingly surrendered some degree of physical 
control. Courts employing the knowing surrender of physical control 
analysis should also determine if this analysis satisfies traditional as-
sumption of risk criteria and if the extent of control surrendered af-
fects the third party's legal ability to consent to search. 
The traditional assumption of risk doctrine requires that the home-
owner voluntarily encounter a known and appreciated danger.136 To 
ascertain that the danger was known and appreciated, courts would 
have to decide whether the homeowner realized that the babysitter 
might admit the police to conduct an unauthorized search, and 
whether the homeowner realized that the babysitter, the known and 
accepted risk, was more likely to consent to the search than the bur-
glar, the risk encountered by leaving the house empty. Although the 
traditional assumption of risk doctrine requires courts to confront 
these questions, ascertaining the answers is no small matter. 
Neither the homeowner nor the court can accurately compare the 
likelihood that a babysitter will consent to a search of the home with 
the likelihood that a burglar will break into the house and then con-
sent tci a search.137 Thus the requirement that the risk be known and 
appreciated is virtually insurmountable. 
To ascertain if the homeowner has actually made a voluntary 
choice between reasonable alternatives, courts should inquire into 
the homeowner's alternatives to leaving his home unoccupied or to 
hiring a babysitter to care for his small children. If no reasonable 
alternatives exist, no assumption of the risk has occurred. Courts 
have, unfortunately, failed to confront these questions in third-party 
consent situations, just as they have failed to confront them when 
attempting to distinguish what is private from what is public.138 The 
Supreme Court continues to announce conclusions expressed in su-
perficial assumption of risk terminology without attempting rea-
soned analysis. 
Even if traditional requirements of assumption of risk are met, ap-
plying assumption of risk to third-party consent problems is espe-
cially tenuous. An interpretation of the assumption of risk doctrine 
broad enough to eliminate all expectations of privacy would emascu-
136. See notes 89-93 supra and accompanying text. 
137. $ee Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 406-07. 
138. See notes 94-97, 109-14 supra and accompanying text. 
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late the fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable 
searches because the target will always have acquiesced in the intru-
sion.139 The nature of the third party's conduct would therefore be-
come irrelevant. If an owner relinquishes his expectation of privacy 
in his premises whenever he hires a babysitter, the fourth amend-
ment requires no additional relinquishment of the owner's rights140 
by the babysitter. Regardless of the third party's consent or lack of 
consent,141 the police are merely entering an area in which the owner 
had no expectation of privacy. 
If the effect of assuming the risk is viewed narrowly, however, an 
individual voluntarily relinquishing his justifiable expectation of pri-
vacy to designated persons may nevertheless retain his privacy 
against all others.142 Recognition of limited assumption of risk or 
qualified expectation of privacy does not give the third party author-
ity to set aside the target individual's remaining expectation of pri-
vacy.143 If the target individual retains his justifiable expectation of 
privacy against everyone except the third party he has knowingly se-
lected, the search threatens this remaining expectation of privacy. 
The government should therefore obtain the consent of the target 
rather than that of any third party.144 Courts, however, have rejected 
this theory of a selective expectation of privacy.145 In the secret agent 
139. Note, supra note 97, at 804 n.112: "[T]he consent question here relates to the 
issue whether the fourth amendment applies in the first place. In other words did the 
person knowingly expose information to the public." 
140. Of course, the babysitter by virtue of her presence has her own right of privacy 
in the premises and her action is required to relinquish her rights. The owner has a 
certain expectation of privacy by virtue of being the owner, and the third party has a 
certain expectation of privacy by virtue of being present. Certainly each can relin-
quish his own expectation of privacy, but what authorizes the third party to relinquish 
the owner's expectation of privacy? Professor Weinreb has suggested that each party 
with an interest has the independent power to deal with that interest and neither pcu;ty 
can limit the interest of the other. Weinreb, supra note 2, at 61. If two owners fully 
control access to the premises, each owner may admit anyone. In so doing, one owner 
is not waiving the rights of the other owner, but is merely exercising his own right to 
do as he pleases with his property. 
This analysis raises two questions. First, does it apply to situations where the third 
party, a babysitter, for example, is not a coowner but derives his interests from the 
owner? Presumably, the owner has the right to limit the interest surrendered to such 
a third party. 79 HARv. L. REv. 1513, 1515 (1966). Second, even in situations where two 
parties have independent interests in the place to be searched or the item to be seized, 
is the third party truly interested in the sense that the searcher and the target individ-
ual are? In the vast majority of cases the third party has no desire to exercise his 
independent interest, because he is disinterested and his consent is "a passive acqui-
escence at best." Id at 1515 n.7. See also Mascolo, supra note 123, at 369-77. 
141. If the target individual has relinquished his expectation of privacy, he has no 
standing to contest the constitutionality of a search that may have violated another's 
fourth amendment rights. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). 
142. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488·89 (1964). 
143. Because the courts have held that "Fourth Amendment rights are personal 
rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted," id., they should also hold that such 
rights may not be vicariously waived. See Alderman v. United States, 494 U.S. 165, 179 
& n.11 (1964). 
144. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489 (1964): "It is important to bear in mind that 
it was the petitioner's constitutional ri~ht which was at stake here, and not the [third 
party's]. It was a right, therefore, which only the petitioner could waive by word or 
deed, either directly or through an agent." 
145. The courts have tended to recognize limited assumption of risk (or qualified 
expectation of privacy) only if the limitation is expressed in terms of physical areas. 
Thus, the owner may tell his_ babysitter, "You may enter the television room, the kitch-
en, and the children's bedroom, but you may not enter the master bedroom." If the 
babysitter violates these instructions and enters the master bedroom, she becomes a 
trespasser and cannot authorize a search of the forbidden area. See State v. Evans, 45 
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and informer cases, for example, courts construe relinquishment of 
privacy to one individual as a general release of the expectation of 
privacy. 
Secret Agents and Informers 
The secret agent and informer problem includes undercover police-
men such as Mary in the hypothetical situation previously developed. 
This probelm also includes government agents who purchase narcot-
ics, infiltrate political or social organizations, report or record conver-
sations with friends and associates, or disguise themselves to gain 
access to homes or businesses.146 
The Supreme Court has generally declined to impose fourth 
amendment requirements on secret agents and informers.147 The 
only meaningful restraints originated in the pre-Katz cases that took 
a property-oriented approach148 to privacy. Thus, when a govern-
Hawaii 622, 631-34, 372 P.2d 365, 371-73 (1962). But if the owner expresses his qualified 
expectation of privacy in terms of purposes, not places, the courts are less willing to 
recognize a qualified right of privacy. Thus, although the owner may instruct his ba-
bysitter, "You may enter all rooms of the house for purposes related to babysitting, but 
you may not allow the police to enter for the purpose of searching,'' if the babysitter 
violates these instructions and admits the police, her consent is deemed valid and the 
search is not a violation of the owner's right to privacy. See United States v. Miller, 425 
U.S. 435, 443 (1976). But c[. Stoner v. Califorrua, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel em,;>loyee's 
consent to search of guest s room held invalid where police had no basis to believe the 
employee was authorized to permit the search). The courts have not distinguished 
these two situations. The owner's subjective intent in both situations is the same; in 
neither case does he intend to authorize the third party to consent to a search. Nor 
does a distinction arise in terms of physical control. If the ''forbidden bedroom" is not 
actually locked, then as a practical matter the third party has access to all parts of the 
house. The courts have not explained why one must assume the risk that a third party 
will violate an agreement not to authorize a search, but does not assume the risk that a 
third party will violate an agreement not to enter a restricted physical area. Again, 
assumption of risk is merely a conclusion and not a reason. 
146. See Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEx. L. REV. 203 
(1975); Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent 
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Stone, supranote 2; Comment, Present and Sug-
gested Limitations on the Use of Secret Agents and Informers in Law Enforcemen~ 41 
U. COLO. L. REV. 261 (1969). 
147. See, e.g. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971); Lewis v. United States, 
385 U.S. 206, 208 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 300 (1966); On Lee v. United 
States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952). 
The Court has, however, placed fifth and sixth amendment restrictions on the use of 
secret agents and informers. In Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963), Chief Jus-
tice Warren noted: ''This Court has not yet established the limits within which the 
police may use an informer to appeal to friendship and camaraderie-in-crime to induce 
admissions from a suspect, but suffice it to say here, the issue is substantial" Id at 
444 (Warren, C.J., concurring). See generally Greenawalt, The Consent Problem in 
Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring With the Consent of a Par-
ticipant in a Conversation, 68 CoLUM. L. REV. 189 (1968). 
The use of informers can also be regulated under due process or the courts' supervi-
sory powers, see Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 320 (1966) ("affront to the quality 
and fairness of federal law"). But see McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 307 (1967) 
(" IW] e accept the premise that the informer is a vital part of society's defensive arse-
nal.")( quoting State v. Burnett, 42 N.J. 377, 385, 201A.2d39, 49-50 (1964)); H. UVILLER, 
Tm: PROCESSES OF CRThfiNAL JUSTICE: !NvES'F!GA'l'ION 439 (1974) ("the criminal insider. 
secretly cooperating with the police or turning subsequently aNainst his criminal asso-
ciates, performs an indispensable service t0--law enforcement'). 
148. In the area of secret agents, the Supreme Court has taken "an extremely nar-
ment agent uses misrepresentation, impersonation, or subterfuge to 
gain admittance to the premises, 149 courts have generally held that 
the government activity constitutes a search within the prohibitions 
of the fourth amendment.15° Courts are familiar with questions of 
physical trespass and the seizure of tangibles because of the fourth 
amendment's development from property law.151 The more complex 
issue, seizure of intangible property such as conversations, requires 
courts again to struggle with the justifiable expectation of privacy 
problem.152 The Court has unanimously and consistently held that 
the use of secret agents to deceive individuals into revealing informa-
tion in conversation, absent electronic recording or transmitting de-
vises, is beyond the scope of the amendment.153 
The critical question for the Court is whether the use of an elec-
tronic eavesdropping device subjects this kind of governmental con-
duct to the coverage of the fourth amendment. The Court addressed 
the question in United States v. White, 154 and held that use of elec-
tronic surveillance devices by agents in direct conversation with the 
target does not violate the fourth amendment.155 The Court pro-
ceeded from the unchallenged premise that speakers must assume 
the risk of informers and secret agents without electronic devices,156 
row view of what constituted an invasion of privacy. The privacy analysis which re-
sulted is little different from the property analysis ..•• " Note, supra note 97, at 798. 
149. "In attempting to gain entry to individuals' homes and offices ••• government 
agents have posed as refrigerator salesmen, Western Union employees, air condition-
ing mechanics, representatives of the County Assessor's Office, carpet salesmen, 
friends of purported mutual friends, and so on." Stone, supra note 2, at 1258-59 (cita-
tions omitted). 
150. E.g. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921); Fraternal Order of Eagles 
v. United States, 57 F.2d 93, 94 (3d Cir. 1932); United States v. General Pharmacal Co., 
205 F. Supp. 692, 695 (D.N.J. 1962); United States v. Reckis, 119 F. Supp. 687, 690 (D. 
Mass. 1954); United States v. Mitchneck, 2 F. Supp. 225, 226 (M.D. Pa. 1933); People v. 
Mesaris, 14 Cal. App. 3d 71, 75, 91 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840 (1970). 
151. See notes 19-29 supra and accompanying text. 
152. Miller, Computer v. Personal Dignity, 7 TRIAL 26 (March/AP.ril 1971). "From 
the constitutional point of view privacy under the Fourth and Fifth amendments is 
likely to remain a nght to be free of unrestrained p~g, pee:ping and snooping. It will 
be a long time before constitutional law concerns commurucation of thoughts, senti-
ments and emotions.'" Id. at 27 (paraphrasing Warren & Brandeis, The Right of Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198 (1890) ). 
153. E.g. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 
206 (1966). See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971), discussed at notes 154-58 
infra. 
154. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
155. Id. at 753. The Court split five to four on the question. Justice Black con-
curred in the judgment, based on the view expressed in his dissent in Katz, that non-
trespassory electronic surveillance does not constitute a search and seizure under the 
fourth amendment, id. at 754 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Brennan concurred in 
the result, finding that "current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" interposes a war-
rant requirement on both third party electronic monitoring and electronic recording by 
a government agent in face-to-face conversation with the target, id. at 755 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
156. "[H] ow ever strongly a defendant may trust an apparent colleague, his expecta-
tions in this respect are not protected by the Fourth Ainendment when it turns out 
that the colleague is a government agent regularly communicating with the authori-
ties.'' Id. at 749. Cf. Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966), in which Justice 
Douglas applied the limitation perspective: 
552 
(A) person may fake the risk that a friend will turn on him and report to the 
police. But that is far different from the Government's ''planting" a friend in 
a person's entourage so that he can secure incriminating evidence. In the one 
case, the Government has merely been the willing recipient of information 
supplied by a fickle friend. In the other, the Government has actively en-
couraged and participated in a breach of privacy by sending in an undercover 
agent. 
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and reasoned that the risk assumed did not increase materially siin-
ply because the same informers were transmitting the conversation 
electronically.157 Justice Harlan, dissenting, argued that allowing 
third-party bugging would inhibit spontaneity in personal conversa-
tions.158 
The Court's approach to electronic surveillance is commendable in-
sofar as it explicitly attempts to determine proper expectations and 
risks in a free society, as mandated by Katz. Unfortunately, the 
Court has not exhibited the same candor when considering the use of 
secret agents without electronic devices. Instead of balancing the in-
dividual's sense of security against the utility of the surveillance to 
law enforcement,159 the Court announces that the risk of betray8.l. by 
one's friends and confidants is "inherent in the conditions of human 
society" and that "it is the kind of risk we necessarily assume when-
ever we speak."160 
Expectations concerning the loyalty of private parties differ from 
the expectation that a supposedly private party is in fact a govern-
ment agent.161 Betrayals by private parties are not within the fourth 
amendment,162 but the fourth amendment does regulate government 
action through its agents. Citizens would react quite differently to 
reports that their personal confidants are fickle or gossips than to re-
ports that the government has released upon society "sprawling, 
mass-producing, self-perpetuating systems of spies and informers 
.... "163 A citizen willing to risk his privacy in one situation may 
not be willing to risk it in the other situation. The Court makes no 
distinction, indicating that individuals can merely choose their listen-
ers more carefully.164 This approach enables the Court to neglect 
the cumulative iinpact of an army of government spies on society, 
because each individual may avoid the risk or assume the risk.165 
Id at 347 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
157. 401 U.S. at 752. 
158. Id at 787-89 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For an attempt to apply empirical evi-
dence in a similar context, see Brief for Plaintiff, Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972), 
reprinted in Askin, Surveillance: The Social Science Perspective, 4 COLUM. HUMAN 
RIGHTS L REV. 59, 62-88 (1972). 
159. This is the test su~ested by Justice Harlan in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 
at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
160. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966). 
161. Kitch, supra note 36, at 150. 
162. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). However, instances may 
arise in which ''there can be a kind of after-the-fact ratification" of the private conduct 
by government officials sufficient to bring the amendment into play. White, The Fourth 
Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 
SUP. CT. REV. 165, 221 n.107. 
163. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 401; see Stone, supra note 2, at 1236: "[T] here are 
virtually no hard empirical data concerning the use of secret agents, spies, and inform-
ers. Nevertheless, the best available estimates indicate that the practice is employed 
at least tens, and perhaps even hundreds of thousands of times annually, and its use is 
apparently steadily increasing." 
164. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
165. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 752. 
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Characteristically, the Court's use of assumption of risk principles 
in the secret agent cases is superficial, failing to consider the availa-
bility of reasonable alternatives. One obvious alternative is "to keep 
one's mouth shut on all occasions."166 By applying the fourth 
amendment to telephone wiretaps, 167 however, the Court has implic-
itly recognized that total silence is not a reasonable alternative.168 
The Court has failed to explain why an individual must assume the 
risk that the listener is a government agent but need not assume the 
risk that the government is tapping his telephone. 
Another alternative to speaking to government agents, often in-
voked by the Court, is for the speaker simply to exercise caution in 
choosing his audience.169 The Court has reasoned that if a speaker 
doubts the trustworthiness of his listener, confidential communica-
tion ''will very probably end or never materialize."170 This reasoning 
ignores those situations in which an individual must speak,171and 
overestimates the average citizen's ability to recognize a secret 
agent.172 If the individual has the ability to forego speech or to iden-
tify government spies, he does have an alternative to surveillance; 
but the reasonableness of the alternative remains questionable, and 
the Court has failed to assess its social costs. Justice Harlan was 
correctly concerned that widespread electronic surveillance by the 
government "might "?'ell smother that spontaneity-reflected in frivo-
lous, impetuous, sacrilegious, and defiant discours'e-that liberates 
daily life."173 
Summary of the Individual Perspective 
The individual perspective requires courts to identify the interests 
protected by the fourth amendment. The "means-oriented" ap-
proach of Olmstead allowed courts to specify these interests in terms 
of freedom from physical intrusion. Although the Olmstead ap-
proach resulted in unsatisfactorily intricate factual determina-
166. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The individ-
ual is forced to choose between silence and speaking to the entire world, because the 
Court has not recognized the concept of limited consent: "consent to reveal informa-
tion to a particular person or agency, for a particular purpose, is not consent for that 
information to be circulated to all or used for other purposes." A. WESTIN, supra note 
42, at 375. 
167. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350-53; see Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 54-
55 (1967). 
168. ''The only difference is that under electronic surveillance you are afraid to talk 
to anybody in your office or over the phone, while under a spy system you are afraid to 
talk to anybody at all." Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 407; cf Greenawalt, supra note 
147, at 219: "In general, however, it seems doubtful that the nsk of participant monitor-
ing is one that would have any direct effect on communications to friends." 
169. See note 164 supra and accompanying text. 
170. U~ted States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971). 
171. Greenawalt, supra note 147, at 220. . 
172. The average citizen may be dealing with a "skilled professional dissembler, 
able to manufacture the usual mdicia of reliability." White, supra note 162, at 229. 
The individual who is confronted with the possibility that his s.upposed friends 
and associates are in reality secret agents of government must attempt to as-
sess, not only their loyalty as l?ersons, but also the likelihood that they are 
professional spies specially tramed in the art of deception, or that, at some 
unknown level of inducement they would agree to "sell" that loyalty to the 
authorities. 
Stone, supra note 2, at 1241. 
173. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 787 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
554 [VOL. 46:529 
Nature of the Fourth Amendment 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
tions,174 the standard itself was clear. When Katz cut the fourth 
amendment free from the physical intrusion requirement, the Court 
was cast adrift on a sea of uncertainty concerning the scope of the 
amendment. The Court in Katz invoked a right to privacy without 
defining it. The Court stated that not all forms of privacy are pro-
tected by the fourth amendment,175 but provided no meaningful gui-
dance as to which claims of privacy are covered by the amendment. 
Olmstead required precise measurements of physical intrusions. 
The Court must now determine which expectations of privacy are de-
sirable in our society. Some may consider this improper judicial leg-
islation;l 76 others consider it the highest of the judicial functions.177 
Regardless of the view accepted, the Court's invocation of the as-
sumption of risk doctrine is indefensible when used to avoid deter-
mining whether the individual has foregone reasonable alternatives 
to encounter a known risk. Like obscenity,178 the Court apparently 
knows assumption of risk when it sees it, but is unable or unwilling to 
explain how individuals can involuntarily or unknowlingly assume 
risks they do not desire to incur. 
Identifying socially legitimate expectations of privacy would not, 
however, fully delineate the contours of the fourth amendment. The 
Court in Katz recognized that the interests protected by the fourth 
amendment "often have nothing to do with privacy at all."179 These 
other interests are the limitation and regulation of government 
power. A balanced view of the fourth amendment therefore requires 
consideration of the limitation perspective. 
The Limitation Perspective: A Theoretical Model 
The individual perspective places an initial burden on the individual 
to justify his expectation of privacy.180 The type and quantum of evi-
174. E.g. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). 
175. 389 U.S. at 350. 
176. See id at 374 (Black, J., dissenting); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 77 (1967) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
177. See, e.g. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 112-13 (1921): 
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little more: logic, 
and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted standards of right con-
duct, are the forces which singly or in combination shape the progress of the 
law. Which of these forces shall dominate in any case, must depend largely 
upon the comparative importance or value of the social interests that will be 
thereby promoted or impaired. . . • 
If you ask how [the judge] is to know when one interest outweighs another, 
I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as the legislator gets it, 
from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself. 
Here, indeed, is the point of contact between the legislator's work and his. 
The choice of methods, the appraisement of values, must in the end be guided 
by like considerations for the one as for the other. Each indeed is legislating 
within the limits of his competence. 
178. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
179. 389 U.S. at 350. 
180. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra. 
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dence required to meet this burden are unclear because the courts 
avoid determining which expectations of privacy are justified.181 If 
the target individual does establish a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the reason-
ableness of its intrusion. The government's burden to demonstrate 
reasonableness, however, is similarly unclear.182 If the individual 
fails to justify his expectation of privacy, use of the individual per-
spective renders even the "minimal requirement of reasonable-
ness "183 of the governmental conduct irrelevant for fourth 
amendment purposes.184 The governmental conduct is immunized 
from scrutiny even though it results from such illegitimate or even 
malicious motives as governmental curiosity, a desire to gather and 
report interesting information, or personal distaste for the political 
philosophies or lifestyles of certain citizens.185 The courts thus 
"leave the individual at the mercy of the police."186 Other possible 
restrictions cm governmental action, such as the due process 
clause,187 the supervisory powers of the Supreme Court,188 the self-
discipline of the executive branch, 189 and the enactments of the legis-
lative branch190 are illusory. Current practice leaves decisions to in-
181. "[E]ffective articulation of the fourth amendment threshold in the language of 
'privacy' assumes a willingness on the part of courts to deal openly on the plane of 
human values." Note, Fonnalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Pri-
vacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendment.s; 90 HARV. L. REV. 945, 991 (1977). To 
date, the courts have been unwilling to make such value-laden detenninations. See 
notes 63-67 supra and accompanying text. 
182. The fourth amendment prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures" and 
guarantees that "no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause," note 1 supra. In 
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), the Court split over the relationship 
between these two clauses. The majonty stated that "rt l he relevant test is not 
whether it is reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was rea-
sonable." Id at 66. Justice Frankfurter disagreed, arguing that ''the framers said with 
all the clarity of the gloss of history that a search is 'unreasonable' unless a warrant 
authorizes it, barring only exceptions justified by absolute necessity." Id at 70 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The result in a particular case, therefore, turns on the 
relationship between the two clauses. 
183. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15 (1973). 
184. Marullo v. United States, 328 F .2d 361, rehearing denied, 330 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 
1964): "Since we held that the location of the evidence in question was not \vithin the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment, the reasonableness of the search is not a rele-
vant constitutional consideration." See Dworkin, supra note 2, at 335. 
185. Hufstedler, su.pranote 40, at 552. The United States Army's surveillance of pri-
vate citizens in the sixties was directed at ''people who were outspoken against the 
[Vietnam] war, people who belonged to peace organizations, people who criticized the 
President on matters either foreign or domestic. In short, it aimed at active citizens." 
Mikva, Society's Threat: The Military Sleuth, 7 TRIAL 20, 20 (March/April 1971). See 
People v. Collier, 85 Misc. 2d 529, 376 N.Y.S.2d 954 (1975). 
186. Mascolo, supra note 17, at 418. The author also asserts that by classifying the 
government activity as non-search and thereby exempt from the fourth amendment, 
tlle courts "deny the protection [of the amendment] to those most in need of it-those 
individuals who have not given the police probable cause to act." Id at 418-19. See 
also Comment, supra note 32, at 698, noting that "search and seizure, particularly in 
the absence of a warrant, come at an early stage in the law enforcement process. The 
danger of confounding the innocent with the ~ty is greater here than in subsequent 
stages, which may be reached only after a vanety of judicially controlled checks." See 
alsoK. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 172. 
187. See, e.g. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
188. See, e.g. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
189. See, e.g, Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights 
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1971) (testimony of W. H. Rehnquist). 
190. "Legislatures have not been, are not now, and are not likely to become sensitive 
to the concern of protecting persons under investigation by the police." Amsterdam, 
supra note 5, at 378-79. 
556 (VOL. 46:529 
Nature of the Fourth Amendment 
THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 
vestigate, to place subjects under surveillance, or to do anything 
short of search, in the hands of individual police officers, whose 
power is unchecked.191 
A determination that a given form of police conduct does not con-
stitute a search is therefore tantamount to exempting the conduct 
from all legal control. Conduct subject to fourth. amendment re-
quirements, on the other hand, must meet the standard of reasona-
bleness. The limitation perspective frames the fourth amendment 
coverage issue as a choice between requiring the police to act reason-
ably and permitting them to act without legal restraint. The limita-
tion perspective concludes that all police activity should be subject to 
the fourth amendment. In contrast to the individual perspective, 
which is primarily concerned with intrusions upon individual rights, 
the limitation perspective focuses on the unreasonable or irrational 
exercise of governmental power. From the limitation perspective, an 
individual need not establish his right and a violation of that right. 
He must only demonstrate government action sufficient to constitute 
a search in order to force the government to justify that action as 
reasonable.192 · 
Viewing unreasonable government action as an evil is as much a 
value judgment as concluding that privacy is desirable and worthy of 
fourth amendment protection. Although courts must define with 
particularity the concept of unreasonable governmental action, the 
basic value judgment that the government should act reasonably is 
beyond question.193 The concept of limited government is a familiar 
theme of fourth amendment jurisprudence,194 
191. Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 576 (1972). These deci-
sions by individual police officers are beyond the control of the law because the :prime 
instrument of controlling illegal searches and seizures-the exclusionlll'y rule-is not 
involved when the fourth amendment is inapplicable. Improper police behavior is 
thus "concentrated on investigative techniques not covered by the amendment." 
Kitch, supra note 36, at 152. 
192. In his study of Greek jurisprudence, Sir Paul Vinogradoff emphasized that "the 
most usual means of keeping the magistrates in order was provided by the ri~ht of 
every citizen to attack and arraign a magistrate who had actually broken the law,' even 
though the citizen himself was not directly affected. 2 P. VmoGRADOFF, OUTLINES OF 
HlsTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 114 (1922). This right of accusation was "one of the funda-
mental principles of the Athenian Constitution [and] ... it is apparent throughout 
the whole Greek system that its importance was enormous." Id at 115. While appli-
cation of the limitation perspective could lead to the elimination of all standing re-
quirements, see, e.g~ People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 759-61, 290 P.2d 855, 856-57 (1955), 
removin~ the initial burden of establishing a justifiable expectation of privacy does not 
necessarily mean that the individual has no burden to establish some form of standing. 
It would mean only that the burden would be different from the rather confused stand-
ing requirement. The present Court's dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule has 
caused it to take a very restrictive view of standin~ and the scope of the fourth amend-
ment. See generallyKnox, supranote 13 (proposing a more traditional view of stand-
ing and scope of the fourth amendment); Hufstedler, supra note 40. 
193. "The acceptance of police authority depends largely on the belief that its exer-
cise is reasonable." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 
AND GoALS: POI.ICE 18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as N.AC. POLICE]. 
194. Doss & Doss, supra note 38, at 396; Emerson, supra note 39, at 229: ''The concept 
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The power of the state has always been limited by practical con-
straints. Information-gathering technology is advancing so rapidly, 
however, that future limitations on governmental power may be po-
litical rather than practical.195 These changes may signal a need to 
emphasize the moral and philosophical basis for limited govern-
ment, 196 and to return to ''the oldest theme which underlies the his-
tory of American constitutional law, that of Liberty Against 
Government."197 
Although commentators have explained the moral and philosophi-
cal limitations on government as a recognition of the natural rights of 
the individual,198 other mechanisms to limit governmental power are 
present in constitutional law. The notion of checks and balances and 
the concept of separation of powers are unrelated to individual rights 
but also recognize the inherent danger of unchecked power.199 The 
Bill of Rights in general and the fourth amendment in particular are 
restrictions on unfettered governmental power rather than reflec-
tions of natural law rights.200 
Sensitivity to the dangers of unchecked power and totalitarianism 
arose in the years immediately preceding the American Revolu-
tion,201 but the role it played in the drafting of the fourth amendment 
is unclear. Good authority indicates, however, that the authors of 
the Bill of Rights, who had known oppressive government, intended 
to guarantee their successors maximum freedom from governmental 
of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop 
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen." 
195. Robert Henderson, vice president and general manager of the electronic data 
processing division of Honeywell, Inc., notes that computer technology is advancing so 
rapidly that it may soon possess ''the eventual capability to store and constantly up-
date in computer memory all the information available m the world." Henderson, A 
False Fear, 7 TruAL 24, 24 (March/April 1971). 
196. Beaney, supra note 30, at 214: " [ 0] ur constitution and our system of constitu-
tional government reflect a decision that government is limited in the powers and in 
the methods it may use." See generally Goodhart, The Rule of Law and Absolute Sov-
ereignty, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 943 (1958). 
197. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GoVERNMENT xiii (1948). 
198. E.g. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional LaU\ 12 MicH. L. 
REV. 247, 248 (1914): ''The written constitution is ..• but a nucleus or core of a much 
wider region of private rights, which, though not reduced to black and white, are as 
fully entitled to the protection of government as if defined in the minutest detail." In 
arguing against the 1Ssuance of general warrants, James Otis asserted that their issu-
ance was improper because "an act against natural equity is void," quoted in J. 
LANDYSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY m CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 34 (1966). 
199. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (consti-
tutional checks and balances were devised "not to promote efficiency but to preclude 
the exercise of arbitrary power"). See THE F'EDERAUST Nos. 48 and 51 (J. Madison); K. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 30 (6th ed. 1977). 
200. See, e.g, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972) 
(''The historical judgment, which the Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreview,ed 
executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evi-
dence and overlook potential invasions of privacy."); Watts v. Indiana, 388 U.S. 49, 61 
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (describing the Bill of Ri~hts as ''the maximum restric-
tions u:pon the power of organized society over the individual that are compatible with 
the mamtenance of organized society itself''); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 
456 (1948) ("Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on their 
own cannot be trusted."). 
201. In the famous Wilkes affair, the King's Bench invalidated general warrants is-
sued to search for the authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious and treasonable 
paper. Chief Justice Pratt characterized nameless warrants as "a law under which no 
Englishman would wish to live an hour." Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, 769 (K.B. 
1763). 
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Unchecked power to search and seize is crucial to the maintenance 
of a totalitarian state. Totalitarian regimes typically proscribe "of-
fenses" like sedition, unpopular thought, and disapproved literature, 
which threaten the government's existence.203 Plenary search and 
seizure power is essential to the detection of these crimes.204 Strict 
controls on the government's power to search and seize inhibit the 
enforcement of oppressive laws, and serve as a bulwark against total-
itarian government. 
In addition to limiting institutional tyranny, the foUrth amendment 
limits the exercise of arbitrary power by individual government offi-
cials.205 The official who decides to investigate is most frequently a 
policeman on the street rather than a high government official.206 To 
place these decisions beyond fourth amendment control is, in the 
words of James Otis, to place ''the liberty of every man in the hands 
of every petty officer."207 Security against arbitrary police intrusion 
is a basic tenet of free society and lies at the heart of the fourth 
amendment.208 
Although recent decisions concerning border searches209 and air-
port searches210 confer broad discretion on officers in those special-
ized areas, the courts have traditionally recognized that failure to 
impose a reasonableness standard on officials may permit capricious 
or malicious conduct.211 Complete elimination of discretion and the 
potential for arbitrariness, however, is both undersirable and impos-
202. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1969) (the fourth amendment's 
''proscription of 'unreasonable searches and seizures' must be read in light of 'the his-
tory that gave rise to the words'-a history of 'abuses so deeply felt by the Colonies as 
to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution.' ") (quoting United States v. Rabino-
witz, 339 U.S. 56, 69 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)); Weinreb, supra note 2, at 47: 
''The fourth amendment is one of the Constitution's richly generative texts. Its impor-
tant terms are general. • • • The amendment invites treatment as a broad statement 
about the relationship between an individual and the government." 
203. Comment, supra note 32, at 700. 
204. Id. 
205. See, e.g, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (noting the 
"grave danger that .•• unreviewable discretion would be abused by some officers in 
the field"); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523 (1967). 
206. AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE 
URBAN POI.ICE F'uNCTION, Standard 4.1 (1973); K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975); 
N.A.C. POLICE, supra note 193, at Standard 1.3; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW EN-
FORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCI-
ETY 91-95 (1967). 
207. James Otis, quoted in2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 142 (L. Wroth and H. 
Zobel eds. 1965). 
208. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). 
209. E.g, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
210. United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1972). In 
his concurring opinion, Judge Friendly stated that he would have "no difficulty in sus-
taining a search that was based on nothing more than the trained intuition of an airline 
ticket agent or a marshal of the Anti-Hijacking Force," id at 675 (Friendly, J., concur-
ring). ' 
211. New York v. United States, 342 U.S. 882, 884 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
("Absolute discretion, like corruption, marks the beginning of the end of liberty."). 
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sible.212 It is undesirable because mechanical application of rules 
frequently leads to injustice. It is impossible because rules always 
lack sufficient detail to resolve ever:y problem.213 Officials can use 
their discretion properly to further justice or improperly to frustrate 
justice. The remedy for the potential abuse of discretion is to em-
ploy checks and balances to control the exercise of discretion and to 
prevent arbitrar:y action.214 
The Fourth A'fl?.endment as a Specific Limitation on Government 
Power 
The fourth amendment proscribes "unreasonable searches and 
seizures"215 rather than providing a basis for plenar:y control of all 
governmental power. The requirement of a search has bedeviled the 
Court in its use of the individual perspective to construe the fourth 
amendment. The Court has defined the search concept in terms of 
the individual's justifiable expectation of privacy.216 In contrast, the 
limitation perspective emphasizes the conduct of the government 
rather than the expectation of the individual.217 The fourth amend-
ment therefore governs the exercise of governmental power regard-
less of the effect of the search on a particular indivic;iual.218 Thus, the 
limitation perspective defines a search as that type of government 
action that is controlled by the fourth amendment. 
Before the right to privacy became an important fourth amend-
ment concept, courts commonly defined a search as a quest for in-
criminating evidence.219 The Court indicated that fourth 
amendment safeguards should extend primarily to quests for evi-
dence of crime and secondarily to intrusions on privacy.220 In 
Camara v. Municipal Court,221 however, the Court rejected the tradi-
tional definition and applied fourth amendment standards to a non-
evidentiar:y search for fire and health code violations.222 Camara is 
212. K. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 17: "No government has ever been a government of 
laws and not of men in the sense of eliminating all discretionary power. Every govern-
ment has always been a government of laws and of men" 
213. Breitel, Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. Cm. L. REV. 427, 428 
(1960); Goodhart, supra note 196, at 949: "It is obvious that under no conceivable politi-
cal system can there be complete rule under law, as a large dew-ee of freedom of action 
must be left to those who exercise the power of government. ' 
214. K. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 216. 
215. See note 1 supra. 
216. See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text. 
217. See, e.g, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). See also Dworkin, 
supra note 2, at 339. 
218. For an apparent example of the limitation perspective expressed in the termi-
nology of the sixth amendment, see Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
219. See, e.g, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1968); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 
217, 237 (1960); United States v. Gravitt, 484 F.2d 375, 380 {5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 
U.S.1135 (1974); United States v. Goldenstein, 456F.2d1006, 1009-10 (8th Cir.1972), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974); Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 1971); United 
States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543, 545 (2nd CU".), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964); Haerr v. 
United States, 240 F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1957). 
220. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959). Frank viewed the fourth amendment as 
serving a dual purpose. First, the amendment protects citizens from unwarranted 
governmental invasions of their privacy, id. at 365. Second, by prohibitin~ unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, it prevents the government from compromising the fifth 
amendment right against self incrimination, id. 
221. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
222. Id at 530. Defining a search as limited to criminal investigations reduces the 
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consistent with the individual perspective because the fourth amend-
ment grants the same protection to a person accused of a crime as to 
a person who is not. The individual perspective ignores the purpose 
of the government intrusion by concentrating on the scope of the tar-
get individual's rights. 
In contrast, the limitation perspective does consider the govern-
ment's purpose. This perspective recognizes the factual differences 
between a search for incriminating evidence and a routine inspection 
for fire and health hazards.223 In Wyman v. James,224 for example, 
the Court held that routine home visits by welfare workers were not 
searches for purposes of the fourth amendment.225 The Court empha-
sized that the primary purpose of the visits was not investigative 
even though welfare workers could uncover evidence of criminal 
fraud,226 and refused to equate the visit with a fourth amendment 
search.227 Wyman implies that governmental intrusion for purposes 
other than criminal investigation is not a search and is therefore be-
yond the scope of the fourth amendment. 
Unlike Camara, Wyman is incomprehesible from the individual 
perspective, under which an invasion of privacy is not determined by 
examining the invader's purpose.228 The limitation perspective, on 
the other hand, allows the court to moderate the governn:ient's power 
to investigate crime by using the fourth amendment and to moderate 
the government's power to inspect for health, safety, or welfare by 
using other controls. The Court's decision in Wyman therefore 
seems to incorporate the limitation perspective. 
Although Wyman's approach is defensible, its definition of a 
search as a quest for incriminating evidence effectively removes ad-
ministrative searches from the fourth amendment and is probably 
too narrow even under the limitation perspective. The Court has 
recognized, for example, that 'the framers of the Constitution were 
concerned with forfeitures of property as well as criminal prosecu-
tions.229 The concept of the "New Property"230 demonstrates the citi-
fourth amendment to "little more than a rule of criminal procedure," Hufstedler, supra 
note 40, at 557. Of course at present the chief means of "enforcing" the fourth amend-
ment is by the exclusion of evidence in a criminal prosecution, and to that extent the 
amendment has functioned primarily as a rule of criminal procedure. 
223. District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949)' (':P,ublic interest 
required that personal privacy be invadable for the detection of crime'). 
224. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
225. Id. at 317. Alternatively, the Court held that if the visits were searches, they 
were nonetheless reasonable under the fourth amendment, id. at 318. 
226. Id. at 323. 
227. Id. 
228. See District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F.2d 13, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
229. Frankv. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959): "[I)t was on the issue, of the right to 
be secure from searches for evidence to be used in cnminal prosecutions or for forfeit-
ures that the great battle for fundamental liberty was fought." 
230. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.733 (1964). Under the New Property 
concept, 
[ w] ealth is not 'owned', or 'vested' in the holders. Instead, it is held condition-
zen's dependence on the state in many novel ways, exposing the 
citizen to subtle forms of government retaliation short of criminal 
prosecution.231 The Court has recognized the link between govern-
ment information-gathering, enhanced greatly by modern electronics 
and computers,232 and the increased coercive power available to the 
state.233 This information-gathering ability "gives the government 
the raw materials of tyranny."234 
Insofar as all knowledge acquired by the government enhances the 
potential for coercion,235 courts should expand the definition of a 
search to encompass any information-gathering activity by the 
state.236 Absence of intent to misuse information is iITelevant to the 
fact of misuse.237 Just as subjective intent is not determinative of an 
individual's justifiable expectation of privacy,238 courts should like-
wise disregard the governmental agent's intent, benevolent or perni-
cious, in defining a search from the limitation perspective. If a 
fourth amendment search includes any practice by which the govern-
ment is likely to obtain information about an individual, surveillance 
and the use of secret agents are within the scope of the fourth 
amendment. This definition encompasses almost all police investi-
gations because "investigation" connotes careful inquiry, research, 
examination, and systematic tracking, all of which are characteristic 
ally, the conditions being ones which seek to ensure the fulfillment of obliga-
tions imposed by the state. Just as the feudal system linked lord and vassal 
through a system of mutual dependence, obligation, and loyalty, so govern-
ment largess binds man to the state. 
Id at 769-70. 
231. See, e.g, Smith v. Board of Comm'rs, 259 F. Supp. 423, 424 (D.D.C. 1966) (welfare 
benefits are grants and gratuities and "[b)eing absolutely discretionary, there is no judicial review of the manner in which that discretion is exercised."). 
232. See note 195 supra. 
233. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959). 
234. Senator Charles Mathias, Jr. quoted in The Right of Privacy, 7 TRIAL 13, 13 
(March/April 1971). 
235. If courts could develop safeguards against governmental misuse of information, 
safeguards against the mere acquisition of information could become unnecessary. 
The problem with such an approach is that the misuse of information may be subtle or 
secret and thus beyond the reach of effective safeguards. See, e.g, Laird v. Tatum, 408 
U.S.1 (1972) (claim that Army intelligence data gathering had a chilling effect on first 
amendment ri~hts held not justiciable). The Supreme Court has on other occasions 
rested a decision on the opportunities for abuse of official power. See, e.g, United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 230-31, 236 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-47 
(1966); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 343 (1943). See also, Beaney, supra note 
30, at 228 (object of fourth amendment is arguably to limit the possibilities of arbitrary, 
overzealous, governmental action). 
236. See Note, supra note 97, at 788. Judge Shirley M. Hufstedler, circuit judge for 
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, defines a search as "any governmental 
probe, corporeal or incorporeal, designed to uncover or to disclose information about a 
person." Eufstedler, supra note 40, at 561. Although this definition is otherwise 
sound from the limitation perspective, the term "designed" is too narrow if confined to 
subjective intent to uncover or disclose information. It invites perjury, see generally 
Chevigny, Police Abuses in Connection with the Law of Search and Seizure, 5 CRIM. L. 
BUL. 3 (1969); Comment, Police Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases: A New Credibil-
ity Gap, 60 GEO. L. J. 507 (1971), and "hedging" of the facts, seeAmsterdam, supranote 
5, at 437 (motivation is a self-generating phenomenon); LaFave, supra note 4, at 154 
(not difficult to convince one's self of nonexistence of "bad" motive for search). But 
cf. Mascolo, supra note 17, at 416: ''The critical factor in any search is the mental 
processes of the searcher. . . . [I) t can only lead to confusion if one attempts to divorce 
the officer from his purpose." 
237. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Experi-
ence should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the Govern-
ment's purposes are beneficent."). See generallyBacigal, supra note 13. 
238. United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 751-52. 
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The chief criticism of this definition of search is that it would apply 
the full panoply of fourth amendment protection to every attempt by 
the government to acquire information. This application would ei-
ther paralyze the government or trivialize the warrant requirement 
by the very frequency of its use.240 This criticism assumes that the 
full complement of fourth amendment protection would apply to 
every search. The Supreme Court, however, has shown great flexi-
bility in determining what fourth amendment safeguards are re-
quired for various types of searches.241 The Court no longer relies on 
the traditional monolithic view, which imposes all of the safeguards 
or none of the safeguards. If the search -is less intrusive than ordi-
nary searches, the Court requires less than probable cause.242 Con-
versely, a more intrusive search, such as extraction of a blood 
sample, requires more than probable cause.243 The Court has also 
held that strict compliance with all procedural rigors244 of the fourth 
amendment is unnecessary for some information-gathering prac-
tices.245 
The flexibility of this sliding scale approach is appealing. It frees 
the courts from strict formulations of probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion,246 and permits them to react sensitively to the variety of 
factual situations confronting police officers. Ironically, flexibility is 
also the greatest potential drawback of this formulation. The Court 
has failed to explain or define reasonableness.247 Without a standard, 
239. People v. Hobbs, 50 Misc. 2d 561, 563, 270 N.Y.S.2d 732, 736 (1966). See a'tsoAm-
sterdam, supra note 5, at 396; Kitch, supra note 36, at 134. 
240. Kitch, supra note 36, at 134; see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 547-48 
(1967) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
241. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976) (operation of a fixed 
checkpoint); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (search of impounded au-
tomobile); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (search during street encounter when 
officer believes his safety or that of others to be in danger); Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (routine inspection for housing and fire code viola-
tions); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (blood test). 
242. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 30 (pat-down search when officer reasonably believed 
subject was armed and dangerous). 
243. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 770-71. 
244. The procedural requirements of the fourth amendment are a showing of proba-
ble cause for a search, procurement of a search warrant, and specification of the loca-
tion to be searched and the articles sought. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 
(1976). 
245. E.g, United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (regulatory inspection to 
further urgent federal interest sustained if possibilities of abuse are not great); Davis 
v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) (detention for fingerprinting permissible on war-
rant issued for less than probable cause); Camara v. Muruci:pal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 
(1967) (routine inspection warrant granted based on legislative or administrative 
standards of reasonableness). 
246. The reasonable suspicion requirement of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), see 
notes 241-42 supra, has been lowered in other cases. E.g, United States v. Lindsey, 451 
F.2d 701, 703 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 995 (1972); United States v. Marshall, 
440 F.2d 195, 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 909 (1970); Ballou v. Massachusetts, 
403 F.2d 982, 985 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 909 (1969). 
247. Cady v. Dombroski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973): 
The Framers of the Fourth Amendment have given us only the general stan-
the Court merely recites the factual situation and announces in con-
clusory fashion that the search was or was not reasonable.248 This 
"show it to me and I'll tell you if it's reasonable" analysis denies po-
lice officers and citizens advance notice249 of the fourth amendment's 
scope and thus reduces the amendment to a Rorschach blot. The 
limitation perspective offers a mechanism for defining reasonable-
ness within the fourth amendment. 
Reasonableness Under the Limitation Perspective 
The standard of reasonableness employed by the limitation perspec-
tive limits judicial review of searches and seizures by deferring to the 
determination of reasonableness made by some other responsible 
entity. A court's determination that the government's conduct meets 
the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment will not re-
quire detailed factual inquiry, unless the courts themselves have re-
sponsibility for controlling the governmental power to search.250 
The court will simply determine whether the responsible entity ob-
served proper procedure and had a rational basis for approving the 
search. This form of limited judicial review is consistent with the 
approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Stone v. Powezz,251 which 
held that in habeas corpus proceedings, federal courts should respect 
determinations of fourth amendment issues by state courts.252 
. The main purpose of the limitation perspective, controlling the ar-
bitrary and oppressive use of state power against citizens,253 deter-
mines the appropriate mechanism to moderate the government's 
search power. Courts select the mechanism by ascertaining the 
component of citizenry to be searched, and classifying the compo-
nents as the entire citizenry, the citizen as an individual, or the citi-
zen as a member of a group or class. These three possible targets of 
a search suggest three categories of searches and three distinct 
mechanisms to review the reasonableness of each type of search. 
dard of ''unreasonablenesi;" as a guide in determining whether searches and 
seizures meet the standard of that Amendment in those cases where a warrant 
is not required. Very little that has been said in our previous decisions ... 
and very little that we might say here can usefully refine the language of the 
Amendment itself in order to evolve some detailed formula for judging cases 
such as this. 
Id at 448 (citations omitted). 
248. See notes 176-78 supra and accompanying text. 
249. See Wright, supra note 191, at 588 (calling for recognition of "a due process right 
to have one's conduct governed by rules which are stated in advance"). 
250. See notes 279-317 infra and accompanying text. 
251. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
252. The Court recognized that the state court was a "fair and competent" entity for 
adjudicating fourth amendment rights and refused to apply the exclusionary rule. Id 
at 493 n.35. The limitation perspective suggests that administrative officials and the 
general electorate can determine competently certain fourth amendment issues. The 
scope of judicial review required by the limitation perspective is confined to whether 
an appropriate entiw has fully and fairly determined tliat the search was reasonable. 
253. The term "citizens" is used generically to include all members of society, and is 
not meant to exclude aliens. 
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Category I: Searches Applied Openly and Uniformly to All 
Citizens 
If the government exercises its power to acquire information openly 
and equally against all citizens, the citizenry itself should determine 
the reasonableness of the search. This conclusion assumes that a 
body of law cannot endure unless it corresponds with existing social 
mores,254 and that no constitution, law, or court can preserve or re-
vive liberties that are no longer highly valued.255 Indeed, the public 
has the right to judge the reasonableness of government action and 
the wisdom to exercise that power properly. 256 Nevertheless, critics 
could suggest that the Category I procedure improperly submits con-
stitutional questions to majority vote,257 and thus disregards the im-
portance of the Constitution as a guarantor of the rights of the 
minority. The Bill of Rights insulates certain subjects from the vicis-
situdes of political controversy, and entrusts the enforcement of cer-
tain rights to the courts.258 
The individual perspective considers the fourth amendment an ex-
pression of the individual's inalienable right to privacy, and places 
the question of reasonableness of a search beyond the control of the 
electorate.259 From the limitation perspective, however, protecting 
individuals from the tyranny of the majority260 differs from protect-
ing the majority from itself. The tyranny of the majority presents no 
problem when the governmental action in question affects all citi-
zens equally. Underlying the first amendment is the premise that 
well-informed citizens can distinguish truth from falsehood.261 
Courts should extend this confidence in the citizens by deeming citi-
zens capable of determining the reasonableness of Category I 
searches. This confidence in the people's ability to identify unrea-
sonable actions by the government developed early in American his-
tory.262 
254. 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 64, at 41. 
255. L. HAND, Tm: SPIRlT OF LIBERTY 190 (1952). 
256. Placing our hope in the collective judgment of the ;t:ieople does not mean we 
must abandon hope that we will see ''the high resolve of political officials, law-makers 
and law-implementers, to take affirmative steps to protect and enlarge the liberties of 
those they govern. Pollack, To Secure the Individual Rights of Many, in LAw IN A 
CHANGING AMERICA 55 (G. Hazard ed.1968). 
257. Of course the traditional conce:pt of properly limited judicial power restricts the 
Court to deciding constitutional questions as a byproduct of traditional cases and con-
troversies. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S.166, 194 (1974) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972). 
258. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
259. J. s. Mill, On Liberty, in 25 HARVARD CLASSICS 219 (C.W. Elliot ed. 1909): "If all 
mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrazx 
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if 
he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind." 
260. See text accompanying notes 279-317 infra. 
261. Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting). 
262. In the Virginia debates on the Federal Constitution, Patrick Henry rhetorically 
queried: "When these harpies (federal sheriffs) are aided b;y exisemen, who ma~ 
search, at any time, your houses, and most secret recesses, will the people bear it? ' 
Even under the prevailing individual perspective, public evaluation 
of government action influences the judicial determination of reason-
ableness under the fourth amendment. Although purporting to fol-
low ''the rule of law"263 rather than public pressure, courts remain 
sensitive to those pressures264 and have admitted that the "degree of 
community resentment aroused by particular practices" is one com-
ponent in determining the constitutionality of searches.265 This com-
ponent alone fails to provide a reliable method for identifying the 
prevailing consensus on reasonable searches. Electoral resolution of 
the Category I problem eliminates the need for courts to divine popu-
lar sentiment.266 The courts would ensure only that the people have 
an opportunity to determine reasonableness by requiring that the 
search be open and uniform. 
Effective use of electoral power by citizens depends on citizen 
knowledge of the governmental investigatory activity being reviewed, 
and this knowledge results from publicity given to that activity.267 
The publicity requirement is inapplicable to the limited use of secret 
searches by the government. Secret searches are within the Cate-
gory II or ill because they are generally beyond the control of the 
electorate. 
In addition, the government must conduct Category I searches uni-
formly to enable the electorate to assess the searches properly. Uni-
form application precludes arbitrary discrimination,268 and the public 
Quoted in Stengel, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States (pt. 2), 4 U. RicH. L. REV. 60, 69 (1969). 
263. People v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 942, 538 P.2d 237, 246-47, 123 Cal. R_P.tr.109, 118-19 
(1975) (Clark, J., dissenting, adopting opinion below of Thompson, J.) ('''Judges do 
not represent people, they serve people.' ... To do so, they must not represent a polit-
ical or social point of view; they must serve the rule of law.") (quoting Buchanan v. 
Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860, 865 (1966)). 
264. Hufstedler, supra note 40, at 555. 
265. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1968). See also United States v. Martinez-Fu-
erte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 n.14 (1976) (the use of police roadblocks for questionin~ has a 
long history evidencing its utility and is accepted by motorists as incident to highway 
use). 
266. See McGowan, Rule-Making and The Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659, 692 (1972): 
"The measurement of the public temper at any one point in time is an inexact process 
at best, and one for which the Supreme Court is perhaps not peculiarly qualified." 
267. Publicity is essential for effective control of the government. 1 BENTHAM, Jum-
CIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827), cited inK. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 112. 
268. See notes 205-14 supra and accompanying text. See also United States v. Lo-
pez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1101 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (when an airline company "updated" the 
F .A.A-approved hijacker profile, eliminating one criterion and adding two others, one 
ethnic, the other calling for individual judgment on the :part of airline employees, the 
modification destroyed ''the essential neutrality and ob3ectivity of the approved pro-
file"); McGinley & Downs, Airport Searches and Seizures-A Reasonable Approach, 41 
FORDHAM L. REV. 293, 302 (1972): "Informed discussion about the ~rofile is difficult 
because the characteristics are secret. However, these characteristics are ostensibly 
based on the behavioral characteristics of embarking passengers rather than on inher-
ited or social characteristics." 
Courts have occasionally upheld roadblocks because they are uniformly applied, see 
e.g, Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 355 S.W. 2d 686, 687 (I~r,· 1962) ("systematic and indis-
criminate stopping of all motor traffic on the highway')· Although a particular road-
block is uniformly applicable to motorists encountering it, this is not the type of 
uniformity proposed under the limitation perspective. Roadblocks are not uniformly 
applied to an citizens or to a sufficiently large group of citizens, see note 276 in.fr.a. 
Assumin~ that the uniform impact of a roadblock upon motorists using a certain high-
way eliminates possible discrimination against an individual member of that group, it 
does not eliminate the potential for discrimination against the entire group inherent in 
choosing the geographic location of the roadblock. But cf. United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976) (officers in the field do not choose fixed checkpoints 
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will more easily recognize the oppressive use of power if the oppres-
sion is uniform.269 Public opinion rarely rises to the level of a check 
on governmental power unless the public is directly affected by the 
action. For example, on hearing that the government broke into an 
individual's bedroom, some members of.the community would be up-
set because they felt that a wrong was done, and that a wrong done to 
any man is a wrong done to all. Other members of the community, 
however, would show less sympathy because the situation is foreign 
to them and does not affect them.270 The majority of Americans, con-
fident that the government will not conduct a similar search against 
them, would condone the search in the abstract.271 If the govern-
ment uniformly extends the search to all citizens, 272 however, the re-
sult acceptable in the abstract could become intolerable. 
The government's investigations rarely rise to the level of a Cate-
gory I search. The lack of open uniform searches may well reflect 
the electorate's effective exercise of control. The considerable costs 
and manpower requirements of uniform searches also restrict their 
use.273 Census-taking, border searches, and antiskyjacking proce-
operated by the border patrol and officials responsible for making the most effective 
allocation of limited enforcement resources Will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint 
where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class). 
269. Amsterdam, supranote 5, at 427; seenotes 259-62 supra and accompanying text. 
Professor Davis reports that many Chicago police think "all society is divided into two 
classes of people, the 'kinky' (criminal) class and the law-abiding class. The officers 
can tell which are which by physical characteristics and appearance-mostly hair and 
dress, but also the look in the eyes." K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 18. Historically, 
opposition to the government's search and seizure power arises primarily when the 
power is directed against those holding unpopular political beliefs, such as authors 
and printers suspected of seditious libeL Stengel, supra note 19, at 283-85. In Lord 
Pitt's famous speech against the general warrant he noted that government searches 
to enforce the cider tax were ''particularly dangerous, when men by their birth, educa-
tion, profession, very distinct from the trader, became subject to those laws." Quoted 
in id. at 289. 
270. See e.g~ F. CARRINGTON & w. LAMBIE, THE DEFENSELESS SOCIETY (1976). 
271. See note 269 supra. For many police "[t]he working principle is that searches 
of 'kinky' people for drugs and handguns are necessary and proper, whether or not the 
searches would be constitutional if evidence so obtained were presented in court." K. 
DAVIS, supra note 206, at 18. 
272. Perhaps true uniformi~ could be achieved only if the government assigned one 
officer to accompany each individual throughout life. Even then the varying abilities 
of the police officers would mean less than perfect uniformity. Courts must clearly 
define the contours of all three categories by answerin~ such questions as: What is 
''uniformity" for Category I? What is "focus on an individual" for Category II? What 
is "directed against groups or classes of people" for Category ill? See text accompany-
ing notes 316-17 infra. 
273. In addition to the check of an aroused electorate, the sheer scope of a uniform 
practice would create economic limitations on the practice. See Belair & Bock, supra 
note 77, at 147 (use of closed circuit television for street surveillance in Olean, New 
York, was discontinued after one y_ear partly because "the small upstate community 
had too little street crime to justify the costs of intensive surveillance"). See also 
Brodsky, Terry and the Pirates: Constitutionality of Airport Searches and Seizures, 62 
~Y. L.J. 623, 656 (1974) (some airline officials regard the current antihijacking program 
as a "costly overreaction"). Situations exist in which economic considerations do not 
limit a particular practice. Stone, supra note 2, at 1238: ''The vast majority of all cur-
rently operatin~ informers and spies had agreed to serve in that capacity in order to 
obtain a reduction of pending charges or some other concession in the criminal proc-
ess." 
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dures are among the few contemporary examples of open and uni-
form searches.274 Courts must scrutinize these practices for the 
actual uniformity required by Category I. For example, when all air-
line passengers must pass through a magnetometer275 t:lie practice is 
uniform;276 when only "selectees" must pass through, the uniformity 
is destroyed.277 When the search meets the requirements of open-
ness and uniformity, the electorate can determine its reasonableness. 
In the final analysis, society must distinguish between reasonable 
and unreasonable governmental conduct.278 
Category II: Searches Focused on an Individual Citizen 
Although the majority in a democratic state may need no constitu-
tional protection from oppressive government,279 the Constitution at-
tempts to protect individuals and minorities from oppression.280 The 
''right to be let alone"281 relates to the rights of the individual 
against the group, the respective rights of minorities and majorities, 
and the powers and limitations of government in its association with 
individuals.282 Throughout history, civilizations have sought to limit 
the power of government to acquire information about individuals, 
families, and groups within society.283 
Other concepts restrict the government's relations with individu-
als. Considerations of fair play require the government to leave the 
individual alone absent good cause for disturbing him.284 The adver-
sarial system also forecloses to the government certain methods of 
investigation and interrogation.285 Finally, the imbalance between a 
powerful state dealing with weak and lonely citizens, even without 
official abuse, is improper.286 
274. These practices arguably qualify as uniform, although no practice is perfectly 
uniform. See note 272 supra. 
275. The use of the magnetometer was held to be a search in United States v. Epper-
son, 454 F.2d 769, 770 (4th Cir. 1972). But cf.United States v. Mitchell, 352 F. Supp. 38, 
42-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (~ort searches do not invoke fourth amendment standards be-
cause their purpose is air safety regulation, and magnetometer is merely a coarse-
screening device). · 
276. The practice is uniformly applied to airline passengers and not to all citizens, 
i.e, those who never fly. Since perfect uniformity is probably impossible, see note 272 
supra, sufficient uniformity must exist to classify the search within Category L See 
text at notes 316-17 infra. 
277. For a description of the selection process, referred to as the "Gate Plan," see 
Brodsky, supra note 273, at 627-29. , 
278. SeeG. GILMORE, Tm: AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 9 (1977). 
279. See notes 261-66 supra and accompanying text. 
280. See note 202 supra and accompanying text. 
281. Griswold, The Right to be Let Alorn; 55 Nw. L REV. 216 (1960). 
282. Dykstra, supra note 44, at 305. 
283. A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 22. 
284. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). 
285. See, e.g. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 221-23 (1967)(police lineup); Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455-58 (1966) (custodial interrogation by police without 
warning of right to remain silent); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964) (interro-
gation of suspect on whom police investigation has begun to focus); Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964) (use of surreptitious means to elicit incriminating 
statements from suspect while on bail, in absence of counsel). See generallyEnker & 
Elsen, supra note 5; Greenawalt, supra note 147. 
286. Enker & Elsen, supra note 5, at 65. Although these general concepts of fair 
play, state-individual balance, and the requirements of an adversary system have ap-
peared most often in fifth or sixth amendment cases, they cannot be confined to those 
settings. Especially in Miranda and WadE; the Court was concerned with preventing 
such perceived "evils" as inherently coercive interrogations and suggestive lineups. 
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Although these historical concepts may justify creating a separate 
category for searches directed against individuals, the limitation per-
spective also supports the creation of such a category. The limitation 
perspective suggests that the fourth amendment is directed at the 
twin dangers of unchecked governmental search power: arbitrari-
ness and oppression. The potential for arbitrariness and oppression 
increases when the government searches a particular person, as op-
posed to society generally. Abuse of the search power may be inten-
tional, but abuses also can be attributed to the lack of objectivity 
created by placing the agent in an adversary position.287 Frequently, 
the government's position is properly adverse to the individual's in-
terest. Police act as adversaries to suspected wrongdoers by investi-
gating and preventing violations of the law.288 Even when the 
government properly plays the role of adversary, however, the poten-
tial for a loss of objectivity is apparent. The limitation perspective 
recognizes that once the adversarial relationship arises, the fourth 
amendment precludes the arbitrary exercise of governmental 
power.289 
Oppression is the second potential evil of unchecked governmental 
power to search individuals. The danger that the state will abuse its 
coercive power is greatest when a single individual is selected for 
special treatment and deprived of the protection of anonymity. De-
priving the individual of anonymity can cause great psychological 
damage by disclosing the individual's best kept secrets and destroy-
ing his ultimate autonomy.290 Piercing the protective shell of ano-
The right to counsel and the right to Miranda warnings exist not as inalienable rights 
of the suspect, but because the Court has deemed them appropriate remedies for the 
perceived evils. "Even when, in the apparent absence of alternatives, a procedural 
i'ule is held to be constitutionally required, it may cease to be so if suitable alternatives 
are developed, or if other measures have eliminated or brought under control the evil 
at which it is aimed." Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 COLUM. L. 
REV. 181, 181 {1969). 
The Court also has warned that its holdings in Miranda and Wade are not intended 
to create "a constitutional straitjacket which will handicap sound efforts at reform 
.... "Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. at 467; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S., at 239 (quot-
ing Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. at 467). The door was left open to other remedies in 
the form of legislation or administrative regulation of police departments. The Mi-
randawarnings are required "unless other fully effective means are devised to inform 
accused :persons of their ri~ht to silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to 
exercise it." Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. at 444. 
287. When the ~overnment seeks to acquire information about a specific individual 
it may approach him and ask for permission to collect information. In such a situation 
the individual serves as a check upon the government power and presumably would 
demand a statement justifying the government's request. If the individual consents, 
the purpose of the fourth amendment under the limitation perspective has been 
served, because the individual has acted as an appropriate entity to review the reason-
ableness of the government action. If the individual withholds permission to search, 
then the adversary relation between government and individual arises. Similarly, if 
the government never seeks :permission from the individual, the government's interest 
is usually adverse to the individual's interest. 
288. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 360. 
289. "[W]hen we say a decision is ad hoc, random, or unreviewable we mean in ef-
fect the decision is lawless." Wright, supra note 191, at 588. 
290. A. WESTIN, supra note 42, at 33-34! 
1Q7R1 
nymity may also subject the individual to manipulation by those who 
know his intimate secrets. Persons privy to this information can use 
it to stifle free expression, to serve improper political purposes, or to 
modify behavior. The Founding Fathers understood the need for an-
onymity in a system of free expression. Between 1789 and 1809, for 
example, many prominent public officials published political writing 
either anonymously or under pseudonyms.291 The Supreme Court 
has recognized that anonymity is an important means of protecting 
individuals holding unorthodox beliefs from government oppres-
sion. 292 Even without government reprisal, the mere loss of anonym-
ity may silence dissenters.293 
In addition, loss of anonymity may alter the individual's conduct by 
encouraging conformity. Although the government has many tech-
niques for reprisals against heretics and rebels,294 government power 
to conduct investigations and surveillance of individuals exacts con-
formity and acts as a form of reprisal.295 Clinical studies indicate 
that few people possess the necessary courage to resist authority, es-
pecially when it is wielded by a powerful government against isolated 
individuals.296 The government can easily augment its coercive pow-
ers by publicizing its investigations, because most people will infer 
Each person is aware of the gap between what he wants to be and what he 
actually is, between what the world sees of him and what he knows to be his 
much more complex reality .... Every individual lives behind a mask in this 
manner. . • • If this mask is torn off. and the individual's real self bared to a 
world in which everyone else still wears his mask and believes in masked per-
formances, the individual can be seared by the hot light of selective, forced 
exposure. The numerous instances of suicides and nervous breakdowns re-
sulting from such exposures by government investigation, press stories, and 
even published research constantly remind a free society that only grave so-
cial need can ever justify destruction of the privacy which guards the individ-
ual's ultimate autonomy. 
291. Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1085 
(1961): 
The Federalist papers of Hamilton, Madison and Jay were published originally 
as letters to the editor under the name of 'Publius.' The Letters of Pacificus by 
Alexander Hamilton defending Washin~on's proclamation of neutrality and 
Madison's answering Letters of Helvidius were published anonymously. 
Even Chief Justice Marshall, writing anonymously as a 'friend to the Repub-
lic,' vigorously defended certain Supreme Court decisions against attacks by 
Spencer Roane, also writing anonymously. 
292. E.g, Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1960); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 
60, 65 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama 
ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
293. Politically active citizens could hardly remain anonymous under the present 
system, se~ e.g, Donohoe v. Duling, 330 F. Supp. 308, 309 (E.D. Va. 1971): "It has long 
been the policy in Richmond and other places throughout the nation to photograph 
persons participating in vigils, demonstrations, protests and other like activities 
whether peaceful or otherwise." Donohoe also suggests that such police practices "are 
not only permissible and constitutional, but they are also commendable and should be 
encouraged." Id at 311. 
294. See notes 230-31 supra and accompanyin~ text. See also Ervin, supra note 44, at 
14, noting ''the habit all governments and all societies have of surveillance, blacklisting 
and subtle reprisal for unpopular political or social views." 
295. Johoda & Cook, Security Measures and Freedom of Though~ 61 YALE L.J. 295, 
318 (1952). For a discussion of totalitarian regimes' efforts at behavior modification 
through government investigation and surveillance, see H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF 
TOTALITARIANISM 431 (1951). For a discussion of behavior modification in the United 
States during the McCarthy era, see P. LAzARsFELD & W. THIELENS, THE ACADEMIC 
MIND (1958). 
296. Milgram, The Compulsion to Do Evi~ in PATI'ERNS OF PREJUDICE 3, 5 (Nov.-Dec. 
1967). 
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evil deeds from the mere fact of investigation.297 Thus, the public 
prosecutor possesses awesome discretionary power to investigate cit-
izens and to release public statements pursuant to the investigation 
that adversely affect the investigated citizen's reputation.298 Any 
government official with unchecked power to investigate individual 
citizens poses a similar threat.299 
Thus, when the government directs its power to search at individ-
ual citizens, arbitrariness and oppression are likely incidents. The 
limitation perspective suggests that the fourth amendment requires 
some entity to check and control such power. The general public 
provides an inadequate safeguard against undisclosed governmental 
conduct directed at individuals.30° Commentators have advocated 
administrative regulation of searches and police conduct to restrain 
governmental power.301 Regulations provide general rules or stand-
ards for controlling police conduct and eliminate the need for a de-
tailed factual inquiry in recurring situations.302 These benefits 
diminish when the government focuses on a single individual, and 
therefore administrative regulations are inappropriate to govern 
searches directed at individuals.3°3 The government should justify 
its decision to investigate a particular individual because its coercive 
power is strongest and most frightening when directed at particular 
individuals.304 A less detailed justification, such as compliance with 
a regulation, should suffice to legitimize searches conducted against 
297. Comment, supra note 32, at 701: "What the innocent citizen has most reason to 
fear is being singled out as the object of official suspicion." But cf. United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976): "Selective referral may involve some annoy-
ance, but it remains true that the stops should not be frightening or offensive because 
of their public and relatively routine nature." In his dissenting opinion in Martinez-
Fuerte, Justice Brennan stated: "One wonders what actual experience supports my 
Brethren's conclusion that referrals 'should not be frightening or offensive .••• ' " Id. 
at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
298. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 24 J. AMER. Jun. Soc'Y. 18, 18 (1940). 
299. K. DAVIS, supra note 66, at 22. Professor Davis states: 
[A] decision to investigate calls for further discretionary determinations of 
what to investigate, what parties, by what methods, when, how broadly and 
how deeply. Each facet of each question necessarily involves a separate dis-
cretionary determination. Even a negative decision has to determine what 
and who will not be investigated when. 
Id. 
300. See notes 268-72 supra and accompanying text. 
301. K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 158; Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 416-28; McGowan, 
supra note 266, at 663; Wrig~t, supra note 191, at 587-93. 
302. See generally Dworkin, supra note 2. 
303. Administrative rem.tlations are appropriate to govern searches against groups, 
however. See notes 318-60 infra and accompanying text. 
304. The individual has a right to ask whether "the Government has good grounds 
for singling him out for_ special scrutiny." Christie, supra note 77, at 886. When two 
individuals are treated differently the government agent authorizing or conducting the 
search 
should be able to point to some distinction between the two cases which it is 
permissible for him to consider. While he may not be able to articulate in 
advance what all the distinguishing factors in all cases will be, he must at least 
be able to show later that cases treated differently were in fact different in 
some relevant respect-that is, that he is following some sort of rational, non-
discriminatory rule. If he cannot make such a showing, his different treat-
1n1701 l';.'71 
groups of citizens,305 or against the citizenry as a whole.306 
When the government conducts a search of an individual, the ap-
propriate fourth amendment check is the warrant clause and the rec-
ognized exceptions to it. Magistrates, in issuing or denying 
warrants, and the courts, in determining whether a warrantless 
search is constitutional, are the appropriate entities to control the 
government's power to search individual citizens. Only magistrates 
and courts can effectively check governmental imposition on individ-
uals because the general public often is unwilling, and the drafters of 
administrative regulations usually are unable, to consider meaning-
fully the unique facts of each search focused on an individual citizen. 
Definitions are necessary for two terms integral to analysis of 
searches focused on individuals, "focus" and ''individual." The focus 
test of Escobedo v. Illinow07 enjoyed a short period of prominence 
until Miranda v. Arizona308 overruled it by implication. The 
Supreme Court has recently disposed of the focus concept in police 
interrogation cases.309 The Court can nevertheless use the focus test 
effectively in fourth amendment cases. 
Although criticism of the focus test of Escobedo centered on its 
vagueness,310 this criticism applies to any principle until the princi-
ple has been interpreted and employed in specific fact situations.311 
Further judicial interpretation could refine the focus concept for use 
in moderating searches directed at individuals.312 The vagueness of 
the Escobedo focus test resulted primarily from the Court's failure to 
consider the proper perspective from which to define ''focus." If 
some subjective standard is chosen, the state of mind of the police on 
the one hand, or of the suspect on the other, are alternatives. Inquir-
ies into subjective thoughts and motivations of police officers and 
ment of the two cases is irrational or invidious, and hence violative of equal 
protection. 
Wright, supra note 191, at 594. Although Judge Wright was referring to prosecutors, 
the same standard should apply to police officers who exercise a similar discretion: 
In our entire system of law and government, the greatest concentrations of 
unnecessary discretionary J?OWer over individual parties are not in the regula-
tory agencies but are in police and prosecutors. . . . The police are among the 
most important policy-makers of our entire society. And they make far more 
discretionary determinations in individual cases than any other class of ad-
ministrators; I know of no close second. 
K. DA VIS, supra note 66, at 222. 
305. See notes 318-60 infra and accompanying text. 
306. See notes 254-78 supra and accompanying text. 
307. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Regarding the focus problem, the Court in Escobedo stated: 
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the mvestigation is no longer a general 
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, 
the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process 
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the sus-
pect has re~uested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, 
and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional 
right to remain silent, the accused has been denied ''the Assistance of Coun-
sel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution . . . . 
Id. at 490-91. 
308. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
309. E.g~ Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). 
310. SeeEnker & Elsen, supra note 5, at 70-77. 
311. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 352; LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitu-
tion.· Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 68 (1968). 
312. LaFave, supra note 311, at 46 n.28. 
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suspects would probably be fruitless.313 By defining search as any 
government activity intended or likely to produce information about 
citizens, courts could solve these problems of perspective.314 The 
courts could then apply an objective standard except in cases where 
the searcher's subjective intent is clear.315 
The remaining definitional problem for Category II searches is the 
term "individual." Courts need not limit application of Category II 
standards to searches directed at the solitary citizen,316 but also may 
apply these standards to searches directed against two, three, or 
more specified individuals. Category I and Category II searches are 
easily distinguishable. When the government activity is not applied 
uniformly to all citizens, some focusing of the search power is readily 
apparent. Distinguishing between Categories II and III is more diffi-
cult. If the government directs a search at some identifiable class or 
group, the court must determine whether the group is sufficiently 
large that the safeguards of Category III should attach, or whether 
the group is so small that the more stringent safeguards of Category 
II should apply. Courts will encounter situations in which the line is 
difficult to draw, but can generally distinguish Category II and Cate-
gory III searches by considering the relative adequacy of the checks 
on the government's power to search.317 Even if a court improperly 
categorizes a particular factual situation, the limitation perspective 
guarantees some fourth amendment protection against arbitrary and 
oppressive government action to each category. In contrast, a court 
invoking the individual perspective to determine that a given action 
is not a search eliminates all fourth amendment protections. 
Category III: Searches Directed Against Groups or Classes of 
Citizens 
Category III occupies the large middle ground between Category I, 
open and uniform searches, and Category II, searches focused on in-
313. See note 236 supra. 
314. See text accompanying note 239 supra. 
315. This objective approach is apparently the direction the lower courts were tak-
ing in interpreting Escobedo, see Enker & Elsen, supra note 5, at 70. 
316. Nor is the suggested definition of focus limited to situations in which the gov-
ernment has selected a named or identifiable/erson. Random selections, such as 
spot checks for enfori:ing auto registration an licensing requirements, would be a 
form of focus under the proposed focus concept. Cf. State v. Kabayama, 9B N.J. 
Super. B5, BB, 236 A.2d 164, 166 (App. Div. 1967) ( [t)he temporary stoppage of vehicles 
upon the highways, either singly or as a part of a check by means of a roadblock proce-
dure" is a valid exercise of the state's power to regulate its highways). 
317. Courts can base the line between Category II and Category m searches on 
general considerations in defining a "sufficiently large group" versus an ''isolated indi-
vidual." While the line ultimately drawn may be somewhat arbitrary, the limitation 
perspective obviates the detailed factual inquiry characteristic of the individual per-
spective. See generallyDworkin, supra note 2. 
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dividuals. Category III procedures determine the reasonableness of 
the government's efforts to acquire information about members of a 
group or class of people. Police frequently justify searches focused 
on members of groups or classes by contending that their conduct is 
a necessary and proper police practice in these situations. For ex-
ample, the high statistical frequency of injury inflicted on policemen 
by armed traffic violators suggests that all motorists who are stopped 
or arrested should be searched for weapons.318 The police contend, 
therefore, that a weapons search incident to a traffic stop is a routine 
procedure necessary for police safety and is accordingly reasonable 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment. 
Courts have been inconsistent in assessing the reasonableness of 
particular searches, sometimes emphasizing routine police proce-
dures and other times emphasizing the unique factual situation.319 
Although an emphasis on particular facts may reflect proper judicial 
restraint and is consistent with a view of the fourth amendment as a 
guarantor of individual rights, this approach emasculates the fourth 
amendment as a means of checking government power.320 The limi-
tation perspective suggests that the fourth amendment, as enforced 
by the exclusionary rule, primarily regulates day-to-day police activi-
ties321 and its requirements must therefore be clear to individual of-
ficers. By emphasizing complex factual settings in fourth 
amendment decisions, however, courts fail to express general rules 
or principles that police officers can readily understand.322 A dili-
gent officer familiar with Supreme Court cases and striving to follow 
the Court's lead may know how to react to a factual situation similar 
to that presented in Katz v. United States.323 Nevertheless, the of-
ficer is probably unable to extract guiding principles from these 
cases to help him deal with the multitude of dissimilar situations 
arising in the course of his day-to-day activities.324 
Courts cannot, however, formulate guiding fourth amendment 
principles, even assuming that their institutional role would permit 
it.325 They lack an understanding of the day-to-day problems of law 
enforcement and their only source of information is the particular 
318. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
319. This swing back and forth from routine procedures to specific facts has been 
most apparent in cases involving automobile searches. Compare Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) with Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). 
320. The assumption "that fourth amendment law can develop meaningfully on a 
case by case basis, and which finds great significance in differing factual situations, is 
an abysmal failure." Dworkin, supra note 2, at 334. 
321. LaFave, supra note 4, at 141. 
322. See LaFave & Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making 
and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MicH. L. REV. 987 (1965). The authors 
cite Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), as a prime example of an opinion that is 
"not written in a way which makes it easy for the police to understand what they are 
expected to do." Id at 1007. 
323. 389 U.S. 347 (1967), discussed at notes 32-36 supra and accompanying text. 
324. The individual officer is unlikely to receive much help from police agencies, 
which have made few attempts to congeal judicial decisions dealing with aspects of 
police investigations into a systematic outline of policy, procedures, and rules. N.A.C. 
Por..rcE, supra note 193, at 25. See also LaFave & Remington, supra note 322, at 1008. 
325. SeeAshwanderv. TVA, 297U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (discussing judicial restraint). 
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record before them in a given case. In contrast, police administrative 
officials, having acquired expertise and perspective on law enforce-
ment, are competent to draft generalized search and seizure rules.326 
Delegating this kind of rulemaking power to police administrators 
has several advantages. The individual officer ceases to be burdened 
with the complex task of interpreting court decisions, and is freed to 
follow the department policies and rules in which he has been 
trained.327 Moreover, because of internal disciplinary measures, he is 
more likely to follow agency rules than to follow the present vague 
judicial guidelines.328 By giving agency administrators an interest in 
enforcing their own rules rather than rules judicially imposed on 
them, supervision of police conduct would improve.329 Disregarding 
whether the rulemaking process can replace the exclusionary rule,330 
the process has many advantages over the exclusionary rule as a 
method of regulating the conduct of individual officers. 
To date, courts have failed to show proper respect for administra-
tive rules promulgated by police officials, even when the courts have 
dealt with routine police procedures. Courts reviewing the constitu-
tionality of routine police procedures have addressed the merits of 
these procedures without attaching significance to their origin.331 
326. Some examples of police rules are set out in the Appendix to N.A.C. POLICE, 
supra note 193. 
327. "If ~olice agencies fail to establish policy guidelines, officers are forced to es-
tablish thell" own policy based on their understanding of the law and perception of the 
police role." N.A.C. POLICE, supra note 193, at 23. Policy should "emanate from the 
administrative level of the police hierarchy instead of from the operational level." Id 
at 25. 
328. McGowan, supra note 266, at 673: 
The police, organized in a semi-military tradition, work in that tradition's re-
sponsiveness to going by the book, which is always less grudging if one has 
had a role in writing the book. The physical structure of the police is also 
directed towards discipline for failure to follow explicit commands from above. 
329. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 
45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 786 (1970): "[T]he Supreme Court, like any other court, lacks the 
sort of supervisory power over the practices of the police that is possessed by the chief 
of police or the district attorney." Administrative rules would also have a much wider 
scope than the present exclusionary rule, and would cover incidents not followed by 
prosecution. K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 127: ''The greatest advantage of required po-
lice rulemaking over the exclusionary rule is that the exclusionary rule reaches only 
two or three percent of ~olice activities, whereas required police rulemaking can reach 
almost all policy activities." 
330. The Court has noted contemporary dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of the 
exclusionary rule as a means of regulating police conduct. See Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 (1976), and cases cited therein. This article is confined to an examination of 
the positive benefits of rulemaking as one means of regulating police conduct. It does 
not address the question of whether the rulemaking process should constitute an alter-
native to the exclusionary rule, see McGowan, supra note 266, at 690, or an additional 
means of controllin~ police conduct. That question requires detailed consideration of 
whether the exclusion of evidence is a constitutional requirement or a judicially cre-
ated remedy. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); Geller, Enforcing the 
Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621. 
331. Compare United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) with Gustafson v. Flor-
ida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). In Robinson, the police officer followed written regulations, 
Thus the courts have failed to distinguish among procedures embod-
ied in a written administrative rule or directive,332 vague unwritten 
rules of practice,333 and mere post hoc rationalizations for unfounded 
practices. 334 
When a written directive exists, the police agency has methodically 
considered, articulated, and adopted the rule.335 If, on the other 
hand, the police practice is vague or nonexistent, the court must act 
as a rulemaker of first instance. In so doing, the court subjects itself 
to the criticism that it is preoccupied with policing the police and that 
it is improperly qualified to write police manuals.336 The courts' will-
ingness to consider police conduct that supposedly conforms to an 
unwritten or nonexistent rule eliminates the checks on power inher-
ent in the process of administrative rulemaking.337 Commentators 
have explored the benefits of police rulemaking in great detaiI.338 
The rulemaking process is consistent with the fourth amendment 
as viewed from the limitation perspective. The limitation perspec-
tive suggests that limiting and controlling arbitrary and oppressive 
use of the search power is an important fourth amendment value. 
Search and seizure rulemaking is implied by the limitation perspec-
tive because rules are necessary to guarantee equity and fairness to 
target individuals.339 
Category ill procedures and criteria of reasonableness therefore 
require that government searches conform to written rules promul-
gated by the government agency conducting the search.340 This re-
quirement facilitates judicial review of the constitutionality of a 
whereas in Gustafson, the arresting officer acted discretionarily or pursuant to an un-
written routine practice. The Court failed to make this distinction although the cases 
were considered simultaneously. 
332. E.g. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
333. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
334. See Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 420. 
335. At present most procedure and policy are "made primarily by patrolmen, the 
least qualified." K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 165. 
336. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-24 (1971) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting). 
337. "Recognition that police policy formulation is an administrative process sug-
gests the applicability to it of administrative procedures found serviceable in other 
contexts." Amsterdam, supra note 329, at 813 (emphasis in original). Cf. Gellhorn & 
Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 771, 792-93 (1975) 
(limiting police discretion is difficult because of the numerous variables in each deci-
sion, the level of the hierarchy at which decisions are made, and their low visibility). 
338. See, e.g. K. DAVIS, supra note 66; K. DAVIS, supra note 206; McGowan, supra 
note 266; Wright, supra note 191. 
339. L. F'uLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46 (rev. ed. 1969). See also K. DAVIS, supra 
note 66, in which the author discusses the basic question 
that legal philosophers have pondered for thousands of years: In our entire 
legal and governmental system, how can we improve the quality of justice for 
individual parties; how can we reduce injustice? Over the centuries, the main 
answer has been to build a system of rules and principles to guide decisions in 
individual cases. 
Id at 215. 
340. Police rulemaking may be voluntary, legislatively required or court-ordered. 
For a discussion of the possible legal foundations of court-ordered rulemaking, see 
Wright, supranote 191, at 592-93. See alsoK. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 131-38; Amster-
dam, supra note 329, at 812-14. With respect to the fourth amendment, police rules 
governing searches and seizures could be required as part of the constitutional defini-
tion of a reasonable search. 
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search,341 and utilizes the searching agency itself as an important 
check against arbitrary or oppressive exercise of the power to 
search.342 Even under this proposed system of police rulemaking, 
the police do not serve as the ultimate check on their own power.343 
Written administrative regulations are simply an initial limitation of 
power with subsequent judicial review344 guaranteeing that the in-
vestigative agency has acted lawfully.345 
Many important benefits would result from requiring an agency to 
limit its use of power by promulgating its own administrative rules. 
The drafting process encourages rationality and circumspection.346 
Administrative standards for searches are certainly preferable to the 
frequently capricious decisions of individual officers.347 
The rulemaking process must be mandatory and visible to check 
the powers of police agencies effectively.348 If police departments 
demonstrate reluctance to draft rules or draft ineffective rules,349 
courts can require35o police administrators to draft rules with suffi-
cient detail and specificity to limit discretion and reduce the poten-
341. The requirement for written rules reduces the dangers inherent in vague rules 
of thumb and precludes the danger of after the fact rationalization, see text accompa-
nying notes 327-30 supra. In reviewing such a rule, one court stated: 
We also note that, after this case arose, the Metropolitan Police Department 
put into operation a regulation restricting on- and near-the-scene identifica-
tion confrontations to suspects arrested within 60 minutes after the alleged 
offense and in close proximity to the scene. We see in this regulation a care-
ful and commendable administrative effort to balance the freshness of such a 
confrontation against its inherent suggestiveness, and to balance both factors 
against the need to pick up the trail while fresh if the suspect is not the of-
fender. We see no need for interposing at this time any more rigid time stan-
dard by judicial declaration. 
United States v. Perry, 449 F.2d 1026, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
342. "Police discretion can best be structured and controlled through the process of 
administrative rule-making by policy agencies." AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION PROJECT 
ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE URBAN POLICE FuNCTION § 4.3 (1973). See 
also N.A.C. POLICE, supra note 193, Standard 1.3. 
343. This concern is expressed by Dworkin, supra note 2, at 344: "The fourth 
amendment exists to control the government. It is folly to let the controlled dictate 
the terms by which they will be regulated." 
344. See notes 356-60 infra and accompanying text. 
345. ''The last word as to the propriety of police-made rules always remains with the judicial branch." McGowan, supra note 266, at 675. 
346. McGowan, supra note 266, at 680. See alsoN.A.C. POLICE, supranote 193. 
347. People v. Sibron, 18 N.Y.2d 603, 606, 219 N.E.2d 196, 198, 272 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 
(1966) (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting) ("frisking a suspect .•• can be done in practice' 
(though not in theory) at the officer's whim"), rev'~ 392 U.S. 40 (1968). 
348. "Department-wide policies, as distinct from the individual conduct of police of-
ficers, can be adequately controlled only from outside a police department." Gold-
stein, Administrative Problems in Controlling the Exercise of Police· Authority, 58 J. 
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 160, 164 (1967). 
349. Most existing police manuals "never discuss . . • the hard choices a policeman 
must make every day: whether or not to break up a sidewalk gathering, whether or not 
to intervene in a domestic dispute, whether or not to silence a street corner speaker 
••.• "PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 103 (1967). 
350. "[W]hile all branches of ~overnment must join in the fight to limit discretion, I 
believe it is the courts which will have to bear the primary burden." Wright, supra 
note 191, at 581. See note 340 infra. 
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tial for arbitrariness.351 Judicial insistence on detailed and visible 
rules will also ensure a role for public opinion in checking the 
agency's power. The more specific the rules, the more likely that 
segments of the public will critique the rules. For example, if the 
police promulgate a rule that officers will or will not shoot looters 
during a riot, "law and order" groups will represent one viewpoint, 
and "libertarian" groups will represent the opposing viewpoint. Al-
though conflicting public input may complicate the rulemaking proc-
ess for administrators,352 it is a necessary part of a democratic society 
and constitutes an important check upon unfettered discretion.353 
Visibility of police rulemaking to the public and the courts would 
help ensure that the police act reasonably, would not unduly hamper 
efficiency,354 and could benefit the police by enhancing public aware-
ness and understanding of the difficulties encountered in law en-
forcement.355 
Although courts would remain the ultimate restraint on the govern-
ment's power to search,356 judicial review would examine the validity 
of the rules rather than the reasonableness of every search on the 
facts of every case. Courts would cease to be the rulemaker of first 
instance.357 Emphasis on general policies appears inconsistent with 
the warrant clause requirement that probable cause be established 
with specificity, but the Supreme Court has relaxed the specificity 
requirement in certain situations.358 Relaxation is also appropriate 
for searches directed at broad groups or classes. Compliance with 
administrative rules in searches directed at groups or classes fulfills 
the same policies underlying the specificity requirement for searches 
351. For a discussion of how meaningful rules can be drafted, see K. DAVIS, supra 
note 206, at 145-49. But cf. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative LaU\ 
88 HARv. L. REV. 1669, 1701 (1975) (inability of formal rules to affect policy choices). 
352. The public's interest in the rule must be balanced against the agency's interest 
in economy and efficiency, see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Board of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 265-67 (1970). 
353. But cf. Stewart, supra note 351, at 1775: 
[P]ublic interest advocates have tended to scorn resort to rulemaking P.ro-
ceedings on the ground that participation in such proceedings may have little 
impact on agency policy determinations. In notice and comment rulemaking 
the agency is not bound by the comments filed with it, and many such com-
ments may be ignored or given short shrift. 
354. Certainly, other administrative agencies have managed to live with the notice 
and comment procedure, and "[m]uch experience shows that the procedure is effi-
cient, fair, democratic, and easy." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 241 (6th ed. 1977). 
Of course, the benefits of airing certain police rules and procedure in public are some-
times outweighed by the need for secrecy. See K. DAVIS, supra note 206, at 74; LaFave, 
Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment: The Camara and See Cases, 1967 
SUP. CT. REV. 1, 33-34. 
355. See, e.g. N.A.C. POLICE, supra note 193, at 9: 'The ultimate goal toward which 
[these] standards are directed is greater public trust in the police and a resulting re-
duction in crime through public cooperation." See also McGowan, supra note 266, at 
663. 
356. McGowan, supra note 266, at 686. 
357. SeeK. DAVIS, supranote 66, at 186; LaFave &Remington, supranote 322, at 1011. 
358. "[T] he Court has now made clear what was left in doubt in Frank: periodic and 
area inSJ;>ections, based on general facts instead of on evidence indicating a probability 
of violation in a particular building, are constitutionally permissible." LaFave, supra 
note 354, at 36. 'The probable cause needed to justify issuance of a warrant for inspec-
tion is not to depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the building in ques-
tion but may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building, or the 
condition of the entire area." Id at 10. 
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directed against mdividuals.359 The policy underpinning the requir-
ment that police establish probable cause before a magistrate is that 
post hoc rationalizations for the search are undesirable.360 Promul-
gating written procedures requires the rulemaking agency to answer 
the same questions generally that an individual officer must answer 
specifically whenever he obtains a warrant. Deliberation prior to 
promulgation determines the scope of the search and articulates a 
rational basis for the search. Thus, judicial review of formal police 
policy regulating searches against groups or classes constitutes an 
adequate check on power for purposes of the limitation perspective. 
Conclusion 
This article has discussed two ways to analyze the fourth amend-
ment, and has offered the limitation perspective as a distinct, theo-
retical alternative to the right of privacy. These alternatives are 
separable for purposes of exposition,361 but in practice courts must 
accommodate both policies, regulation of government power and 
preservation of privacy rights, in fourth amendment decisions. This 
task is not impossible. By emphasizing the flexibility of the fourth 
amendment,362 courts could recognize an absolute right to privacy in 
certain situations,363 a requirement for police to obtain a search war-
rant in others,364 and a general concept of reasonableness to limit 
government power in still others.365 The Supreme Court's dissatis-
faction with the exclusionary rule366 clearly has eroded the legiti-
359. In the context of a search focused on an individual, ''it is the function of the 
magistrate to weigh the facts of the particular case and detennine whether it is proba-
ble that an offense has been committed and that certain seizable items connected with 
that offense are to be found at a specified place." LaFave, supra note 354, at 23. The 
typical magistrate is probably incapable of assessing the complex factors that arise in 
Category m searches. For example, under what circumstances may a police depart-
ment assign additional patrolmen to a selected area in order to obtain information re-
garding groups within that area? Perhaps the most volatile issue is whether police 
may or do assign additional patrolmen to the "ghetto" because the crime rate is statis-
tically higher there than in other locations, see Washington v. United States, 397 F.2d 
705, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1968), or whether police departments provide less protection to cer-
tain areas because of their racial composition, see REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 307-09 (1968). 
360. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964). 
361. Goodhart, supra note 196, at 945. 
362. See text accompan~g notes 241-46 supra. 
363. SeeFisherv. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 n.7 (1976); Note, supra note 181, at 
985-91. 
364. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (government intrusion into pri-
vate dwelling). 
365. Compare Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and United States v. Wade, 
388 U.S. 218 (1967), with Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
366. See generally Hufstedler, supra note 40. But ef. Dworkin, supra note 2, at 329. 
Dworkin cautions against ''the easy assumption that rejecting the exclusionary rule 
will solve the problems of fourth amendment jurisprudence .... [A]ny sanction, any 
remedy, is only as good as the substantive law it enforces. The problem with the 
search and seizure cases lies with the substance, not the remedy." Id at 333. 
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macy of the limitation perspective. Nevertheless, acceptance of the 
historical and theoretical validity of the limitation perspective and a 
recognition of the conceptual problems inherent in the individual 
perspective367 can eliminate judicial reluctance to regulate govern-
ment action by using the fourth amendment. 
367. See notes 174-79 supra and accompanying text. 
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